Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms by Mehra, Salil K.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2016
Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the
Time of Algorithms
Salil K. Mehra
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mehra, Salil K., "Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms" (2016). Minnesota Law Review. 204.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/204
  
 
1323 
Article 
Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: 
Competition in the Time of Algorithms 
Salil K. Mehra† 
INTRODUCTION  
Disruptive innovation can turn users into newly-minted 
economists. Consider the controversial practice of “surge pric-
ing” enabled by the ride-sharing service Uber.1 Confronted on 
occasions such as New Year’s Eve by prices six to seven times 
as much as normal, users tend to ask for an explanation. On 
the one hand, surge pricing resembles basic market econom-
ics—many people want a ride, market demand pushes the price 
up, and those higher prices attract more drivers until the price 
falls to a new level.2 But as Uber’s own marketing recognizes, 
this is a market whose price signals act within a proprietary 
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smehra@temple.edu. The author wishes to thank Greg Mandel, Jeff Vagle, 
Polk Wagner, Harwell Wells, and Chris Yoo for their comments, as well as 
participants at workshops and conferences at the University of St. Gallen, 
Bournemouth University and the University of Pennsylvania. Thanks also to 
Dylan Taylor for research assistance and Sarah Mehra for editing help. Copy-
right © 2016 by Salil K. Mehra. 
 1. See Eric Posner, Why Uber Will—and Should—Be Regulated, SLATE 
(Jan. 5, 2015, 2:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_ 
from_chicago/2015/01/uber_surge_pricing_federal_regulation_over_taxis_and_
car_ride_services.single.html (endorsing arguments for regulation of surge 
pricing, Uber’s term for raising prices at times of higher demand); Ilya Somin, 
Surge Pricing and Political Ignorance, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2014/12/31/surge-pricing-and-political-ignorance (opposing regulation, but 
fearing that “without at least a basic understanding of economics, consumers 
won’t realize that surge pricing increases the quantity and quality of available 
goods”); see also Yves Faguy, The Uber Cartel, CBA NATIONAL (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Blog/January-2015/The-Uber-cartel.aspx 
(discussing surge pricing and noting the possible relevance of Canadian com-
petition law). 
 2. See Jacob Saulwick, Is Cab App Just an Uber Cartel?, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/business/is-cab-app 
-just-an-uber-cartel-20150108-12ktd5. 
  
1324 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1323 
 
black box: “Dynamic pricing algorithmically increases prices to 
encourage more drivers to come onto the platform and increase 
supply.”3 As Uber’s CEO has stated: “[W]e are not setting the 
price, the market is setting the price. . . . [W]e have algorithms 
to determine what that market is.”4 By this account, the market 
is both an independent force of nature that determines price, 
but also paradoxically a result constructed at least in part by a 
proprietary algorithm.5 
Some have observed that the drivers are independent con-
tractors, who “could in theory” compete against each other, but 
who instead have agreed to have their prices coordinated and 
set by the algorithm of a company that gets a twenty percent 
slice of the fare.6 Whether this is paradigm-shifting, disruptive 
technology or a harmful, twenty-first-century, techno-cartel de-
pends in part on the workings of that algorithm. Competition 
law does not yet have a good sense of how to appraise this situ-
ation; how to begin this inquiry is the focus of this Article. 
How will antitrust law work when decisions are no longer 
made by humans but instead by machines? Antitrust’s arche-
typal villains—price-fixing bosses in a smoke-filled room—may 
be coming to the end of their road.7 The increasing power of 
computers has become a game changer. Their rising power, 
plus the growing ubiquity of the Internet, and increasingly so-
phisticated data-mining techniques have driven a rapid shift of 
pricing decisions away from human-decision makers in favor of 
algorithms—defined as step-by-step procedures for solving 
 
 3. Id. (emphasis added); see also Matt Stoller, How Uber Creates an Al-
gorithmic Monopoly To Extract Rents, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/04/matt-stoller-how-uber-creates-an 
-algorithmic-monopoly.html. 
 4. Stoller, supra note 3 (“[Uber’s] algorithm is not regulated nor is it 
transparent, so neither the buyer nor the seller has any credible information. 
This isn’t a market, it’s a monopoly. It’s a special type of monopoly, an algo-
rithmic monopoly. It may mimic market-style pricing, or it may not. That’s up 
to Uber.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Saulwick, supra note 2. 
 7. See, e.g., Transcript of Record of Defendant’s Testimony vol. 12, at 
4889, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 6) (testimony 
of Elbert H. Gary) (describing the famous “Gary dinners,” a series of social 
events and meetings early in the 20th century, convened to encourage execu-
tives of rival steelmakers to tell each other “frankly and freely what they were 
doing, how much business they were doing, what prices they were charg-
ing, . . . and . . . all information concerning their business” in order to stabilize 
prices). 
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problems, especially by a computer.8 Increasingly the software 
programs that apply these algorithms, functioning as “robo-
sellers,” can make pricing decisions autonomously.9 
“Can robo-sellers really raise prices?,” a skeptical reader 
might wonder. The simple answer: they already have done so. 
In 2011, one could find a classic, twenty-year-old, developmen-
tal biology textbook on fruit flies available on Amazon for the 
astonishing price of $23.7 million.10 That particular “market 
price” was set through the interaction of two different sellers’ 
programmed algorithms. The first algorithm automatically set 
the price of the first book for 1.27059 times the price of the se-
cond book—which belonged to the other seller in the market-
place.11 The second algorithm automatically set the price of the 
second book at 0.9983 times the price of the first book.12 Be-
cause the two equations x = 1.27059 * y and y = 0.9983 * x can-
not be reconciled for positive numbers, the result was an up-
ward spiral in which each algorithm’s price hike was 
subsequently responded to by a price hike from the other, and 
vice versa.13 From April 8 to 18, 2011, the offer prices of the two 
books rose in tandem into the millions of dollars.14 
 
 8. Algorithm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam 
-webster.com/dictionary/algorithm (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
 9. See, e.g., John Bible, The Science of Retail: How To Counterbalance 
Instinct with Data-Driven Insight, ORACLE RETAIL (2014), http://www.oracle 
.com/us/industries/retail/view-point-science-fashion-br-2225302.pdf (stating 
that traditional “retailers are still in the early stages of using their data in 
truly scientific ways . . . to turn rich troves of data into dollars by better de-
mand measurement and management” by “explor[ing] every facet of price 
elasticity” and adding that “[e]ven with new products that have no history, the 
algorithms can examine the performance of similar products to discover the 
patterns needed to support initial pricing decisions and to chart a likely model 
for lifecycle pricing”); Natalie Burg, Your Company Can See the Future with 
Predictive Analytics, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 9:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/sungardas/2014/03/26/your-company-can-see-the-future-with-predictive-
analytics-2 (stating that “predictive analytics utilizes ‘a variety of statistical, 
modeling, data mining, and machine learning techniques to study recent and 
historical data, thereby allowing analysts to make predictions about the fu-
ture’” and “can be used to automatically vary pricing over time based on pur-
chasing trends”).  
 10. See CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME 
TO RULE OUR WORLD 1 (2012). 
 11. See John D. Sutter, Amazon Seller Lists Book at $23,698,655.93—Plus 
Shipping, CNN (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/04/25/ 
amazon.price.algorithm/index.htm. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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The fruit-fly textbook example appears to have been the 
product of mistake rather than any conscious anticompetitive 
intent.15 By contrast, suspicions about Uber’s algorithm go to 
whether it has been designed to exploit consumers—such con-
cerns echo calls in other areas for “algorithmic neutrality” to 
prevent economically or socially harmful distortions.16 Given 
the textbook example, whether or not their creators intend, 
robo-sellers can combine algorithmic pricing with autonomous 
decisionmaking to charge consumers higher prices. 
Algorithmic pricing continues to grow hand-in-hand with 
the increasing ability of autonomously operating software-
based agents. Pablo Picasso believed that the computers of his 
era were “useless” since “[t]hey c[ould] only give you answers.”17 
But times have changed; since then, computers with machine-
learning capabilities have bested humans at chess and “Jeop-
ardy!”18—and, thanks to Google, safe driving.19 Their increasing 
ability and autonomy makes them an essential, inescapable 
presence in twenty-first-century business. 
Computers, “big data,” and algorithmic processes have al-
tered how people learn20 and love21—and, of course, how we 
 
 15. As one expert on machine learning noted, “[t]he expansion of API [ap-
plications programming interfaces—specifications detailing how and encour-
aging one program to interact with another] usage in marketplaces means: . . . 
[a]ny PhD with an idea can create a startup to add value to a marketplace . . . 
[and] [a]ny idiot with a questionable algorithm can screw things up for every-
one.” Marshall Kirkpatrick, When Bots Go Mad, READWRITE (Feb. 25, 2012), 
http://readwrite.com/2012/02/25/when_bots_go_mad.  
 16. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing Google and 
the claimed need for “algorithmic neutrality” in search algorithms). 
 17. William Fifield, Pablo Picasso—A Composite Interview, 32 PARIS REV. 
37, 62 (1964). 
 18. See David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An Overview of the 
DeepQA Project, AI MAGAZINE (Fall 2010), http://www.aaai.org/Magazine/ 
Watson/Watson.php. 
 19. See The Self-Driving Car Logs More Miles on New Wheels, GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 7, 2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.hu/2012/08/the-self-
driving-car-logs-more-miles-on.html. But see Fatality Facts, INS. INST. FOR 
HIGHWAY SAFETY, http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/ 
fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (reporting 
10.8 deaths per 100,000 people and 1.14 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles 
traveled in the United States due to accidents in 2012); FARS Encyclopedia, 
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/ 
index.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (recording 29,867 fatal crashes for hu-
man drivers in 2011). 
 20. See James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology To Enhance Access to 
Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241, 255–56 (noting that independent institu-
tions such as the Khan Academy have begun offering free online courses in 
science and technology); Maciej H. Kotowski et al., Audits As Signals, 81 U. 
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shop. Sellers use dynamic-pricing algorithms to gauge supply 
and demand and set prices not only for books and air tickets 
online, but increasingly, for consumer electronics, groceries, 
and other tangible goods in brick-and-mortar stores.22 An in-
dustry has rapidly sprung up to provide software-embedded 
mathematical models that digest mass-collected data to moni-
tor market conditions and make pricing decisions.23 
This Article offers the first descriptive and normative 
study of this change and its critically important implications 
for antitrust law.24 This Article has two goals: First, it provides 
a descriptive picture of the sea change in commerce that is tak-
ing place due to the spread of algorithm-driven dynamic pric-
ing. Second, using that snapshot as a base, this Article strives 
to identify and analyze the broader normative consequences for 
consumer welfare and antitrust law. To be sure, such an effort 
to describe and predict the course of a quickly evolving business 
world must be preliminary at best.25 But it must be examined, 
as the change entailed has become too significant and wide-
ranging to avoid discussion.26 
 
CHI. L. REV. 179, 200 (2014) (noting universities’ use of massive open online 
courses (MOOCs)). 
 21. See AMY WEBB, DATA, A LOVE STORY: HOW I GAMED ONLINE DATING 
TO MEET MY MATCH 71–84 (2013) (reviewing data-driven, algorithmic, dating 
sites). 
 22. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Shopper Alert: Price May Drop for You 
Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/ 
business/supermarkets-try-customizing-prices-for-shoppers.html; Tucker 
Cummings, Everything You Need To Know About Dynamic Pricing, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Saving 
-Money/2013/1104/Everything-you-need-to-know-about-dynamic-pricing (“Best 
Buy is . . . committed to a dynamic pricing strategy . . . .”). 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. This Article uses “antitrust law” and the broader, but similar, “compe-
tition law” interchangeably. 
 25. Indeed, this problem has long been recognized to be inherent in any 
study of a fast-moving legal issue. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Proper-
ty, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964). 
 26. Some commentators express concern about antitrust enforcement in 
fast-moving digital industries on the grounds that the probability and costs of 
errors may be high. See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and 
the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 178, 213–44 (2011) (arguing for cautious application of 
antitrust against Google since a “false positive” might chill “innovation and 
competition”). Others point out that “the features that distinguish” such mar-
kets from “conventional” industries “do not all weigh in favor of biasing policy 
toward underenforcement, the social costs of which could be at least as high as 
those of overenforcement.” Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and 
Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1663, 1667–68 
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This Article sets forth this tale and study in four parts. 
Part I paints the overall landscape. It situates the in-progress 
transformation of sellers, buyers, and price-setting within a 
broader social context in which algorithm-laded software is 
playing bigger and more important roles. Part I describes how 
the rise of the era of algorithms has already changed certain 
industries’ behavior as well as consumer expectations. It then 
explains how as this era blossoms, it is morphing sellers into 
robo-sellers—producing a faster, broader, more-networked and 
increasingly non-human world-spanning bazaar. 
Part II addresses a key risk posed by the robo-seller. The 
paradigmatic harm of collusion among competitors may grow 
and become more threatening. Perhaps worse still, robo-sellers 
may increase the risk that, in some cases, real-world 
oligopolists will operationalize their individual theoretical in-
centives to achieve Nash equilibrium prices above the competi-
tive level, thereby harming consumers. The Sherman Act con-
tains a gap in its coverage under which oligopolists that can 
achieve price coordination interdependently, without communi-
cation or facilitating practices, generally escape antitrust en-
forcement,27 even when their actions yield supracompetitive 
pricing that harms consumers. Antitrust law has famously 
struggled with this issue for half a century—and robo-sellers 
will likely make this gap even more problematic. Classic mod-
els of oligopoly have identified key features that make a cartel 
hard to sustain, and current antitrust enforcement attempts to 
harness some of these features in order to preemptively under-
cut cartel formation. Time lags between defection from a cartel 
and its discovery make that defection more profitable and un-
dermine collusion. Noise, errors, and complexity make “acci-
dental,” but still fatal, defection from a cartel more likely. Fi-
nally, human sellers have hyperbolic discount rates that make 
sellers prefer to cheat on their partners in collusion even while 
they sacrifice future cartel profits. Robo-sellers will “solve” 
some of these issues for oligopolists, making higher prices that 
injure consumers more likely. 
 
(2013); see also Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free 
Goods: Implications for Antirust Enforcement (N.Y.U., Working Paper No. 14-
44, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2529425 (re-
jecting “the position . . . that free goods” commonly found in the digital ecosys-
tem “should not come under antitrust scrutiny”). 
 27 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the 
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
655, 671 (1962). 
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Part III broadens the perspective to include the impact of 
robo-selling on monopolists and more overt cartel behavior. In 
particular, it addresses the implications of the robo-seller on 
cases in which price coordination requires communication or 
facilitating practices in order for firms to come to an anticom-
petitive “agreement.” In these cases, usually analyzed as a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the Nash equilibrium is to “cheat” 
on the cartel, an agreement is required to avoid the inferior 
(from the price-fixers’ perspective) outcome. Under standard 
models of oligopoly, even where sellers have individual incen-
tives to price supracompetitively, they can do better by achiev-
ing an agreement, tacitly or overtly; in some cases, competing 
firms can only achieve supracompetitive pricing in this way. In 
considering how antitrust law should respond, Part III identi-
fies a key creature that is relatively unexamined due to its 
longstanding ubiquity, until now, in antitrust law: the human 
seller. Longstanding debates in antitrust focus on the role of in-
tent in finding a Section 2 offense involving monopoly,28 enforc-
ers’ goal of sowing fear and distrust among potential Section 1 
price-fixing violators,29 and the need for agreement in proving a 
Section 1 price-fixing offense.30 Part III then explains how the 
shift from human price-setting to robo-sellers requires a re-
think of competition law. Specifically, antitrust relies on an-
thropomorphic concepts of intent, fear, distrust, and agreement 
with which it will prove hard to categorize or incentivize the 
robo-seller. Competition law will have to reconsider its embed-
ded assumption of personhood in those it seeks to punish and 
deter. 
Part IV discusses possible solutions. First, it focuses on key 
systemic issues that will complicate antitrust’s rendezvous with 
the robo-seller. It explores two important normative conse-
quences. First, it asks how likely it is that robo-sellers could be 
 
 28. See infra Part III.A. 
 29. Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1695 (2013). 
 30. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
40 (1976) (describing the difficulty of deterring “tacit collusion” when it does 
“not involve explicit, detectable acts of agreement or communication”); Louis 
Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 
CAL. L. REV. 683 (2011); William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concert-
ed Action, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 173 (2012); Turner, supra note 27 (arguing 
that oligopolists who anticipate “the probable reactions of competitors in set-
ting their basic prices, without more in the way of ‘agreement’ than is found in 
‘conscious parallelism,’ should not be held unlawful conspirators under the 
Sherman Act”). 
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successfully regulated. The complexity of the algorithms in-
volved and their interaction makes this potentially a daunting 
regulatory challenge. Additionally, it warns of underestimating 
the benefits of the robo-seller. Even if, as this Article explains, 
both independent Nash equilibrium coordinated pricing and 
collusion become more likely with robo-sellers, they may none-
theless be so efficient such that the benefits of robo-selling out-
weigh its harms. In more formal terms, using algorithms, soft-
ware, and big data to do key business functions such as market 
intelligence, information gathering, strategic management, and 
sales may reduce marginal cost even while they make price co-
ordination—and pricing to consumers above marginal cost—
more likely.31 Part IV then turns to address several possible so-
lutions, including banning robo-sellers, subjecting them to tra-
ditional antitrust processes under the rule of reason, or seeking 
antitrust’s potential evolution within a wider context of how 
law will deal with autonomous agents more broadly. Specifical-
ly, the more general argument that the law should recognize 
that autonomous software agents are evolving beyond their 
original role as the mere tools of their principals is not an easy 
fit for antitrust. The evolving, shifting treatment has been jus-
tified deontologically based on autonomous agents’ incipient 
ability to reason.32 Joining such a solution is not an easy move 
for antitrust, which by contrast is relentlessly instrumental in 
its focus; for example, consumer welfare and the fear of false 
positives have become articles of faith in antitrust.33 The best, 
but imperfect, solution may be to incorporate an evolving ap-
proach to robo-sellers as a reasonable expansion of the Federal 
Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) ongoing regulatory program tar-
geting the competition and consumer protection aspects of pri-
 
 31. There are conflicting viewpoints on how to treat such a circumstance. 
Some commentators view any welfare transfer from consumers to producers as 
in conflict with antitrust law’s original intent and continuing goal, regardless 
of any offsetting, overall, social welfare benefits. See Robert H. Lande, Proving 
the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed To Protect Consumers (Not Just 
To Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 963 (1999) (discussing the 
“wealth transfer thesis”). 
 32. See SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AU-
TONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 171–72 (2011) (suggesting that Locke’s defini-
tion of “person” is consistent with ascribing legal personhood and moral re-
sponsibility to artificial agents). 
 33. Borrowed from medicine and the sciences, the term “false positives” 
refers to erroneous punishment of efficiency-enhancing conduct. See, e.g., Ver-
izon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004). 
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vacy. Looking further into the future, regulators may need to 
develop the ability to test and probe the effects of algorithmic 
sales on consumers; agencies may need to conduct their own 
“algorithmic enforcement.” Significant regulatory efficiencies 
may stem from the overlap between the technologies involved 
and the concerns for consumers that they raise. 
I.  THE AGE OF THE ALGORITHM   
Our digital age relies on the increasing power and influ-
ence of computers, interconnection, especially via the Internet, 
and massive collection and analysis of data. Technological pro-
gress has made our computing devices speedier, smaller, less 
expensive, and, increasingly, mobile. Increasingly, it has also 
put such computing power in contact with the common con-
sumer. Recent versions of the Xbox gaming console have more 
computing power than the flight computer of the Space Shuttle 
Atlantis;34 the Voyager 1 unmanned probe reached interstellar 
space in 2013 despite having less memory than an iPhone 5.35 
Such breathtaking improvement has made computers of all 
kinds increasingly ubiquitous in the twenty-first-century world. 
This power has enabled the rise of sophisticated algorithms to 
model and predict our world—with great impact on society at 
large and on business in particular. 
A. ALGORITHMS IN DAILY LIFE 
The age of the algorithm results from the synergy of math-
ematics, computer power, and the Internet. All three combine 
to empower the collection and analysis of massive amounts of 
data, and to make possible more empirically-driven 
decisionmaking. Before, people might have knowingly relied on 
imperfect predictions or “gut” feeling to handle complex prob-
lems of prediction in the absence of data and models. But in-
creasingly, they can turn to a set of powerful new tools. 
These tools are increasingly ubiquitous. For almost a dec-
ade, “to Google” has been a dictionary verb.36 Its search results 
 
 34. HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Space Shuttle Fast Facts: Xbox 360 Has More 
Power than Flight Computer, Orbiter Has 2.5 Million Parts, AL.COM (July 8, 
2011, 7:01 AM), http://blog.al.com/space-news/2011/07/space_shuttle_fast_ 
facts_xbox.html. 
 35. Amanda Wills, Voyager 1 Got to Deep Space on Less Memory than 
Your iPhone 5, MASHABLE (Sept. 12, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/09/12/ 
voyager-1-iphone-5. 
 36. See Candace Lombardi, Google Joins Xerox As a Verb, CNET (July 6, 
2006), http://cnet.com/newsgoogle-joins-xerox-as-a-verb (reporting “Google” be-
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have long been the product of an algorithm, PageRank, that 
drives its results by steering Web-search traffic to sites that the 
algorithm concludes that users believe to be most relevant.37 In 
addition to collecting and crunching data on which sites users 
click on after doing particular searches, the algorithm also 
gives more credibility to sites linked to by other sites and hubs 
it concludes are influential. 
The application of algorithmic autonomous decisionmaking 
has already moved beyond cyberspace, and has done so at a 
pace that was unanticipated, even by well-informed experts. A 
decade ago experts asserted that driverless cars were techno-
logically infeasible, to little controversy.38 Recently, to much 
media coverage, Google has piloted versions of such vehicles 
that rely on data collection via sensors as well as software that 
applies algorithmic processes; such cars already drive more 
safely than the average human.39 However, all of this attention 
to Google has somewhat obscured the speed with which tradi-
tional automakers are deploying similar technology: Nissan in-
tends to market such a vehicle by 2020, Ford and GM have sim-
ilar plans, and Daimler-Benz already has a Mercedes concept 
car rolling autonomously down German autobahns.40 But with 
 
ing added to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as a verb). 
 37. For a clear, concise and entertaining description of the PageRank al-
gorithm, see STEVEN STROGATZ, THE JOY OF X: A GUIDED TOUR OF MATH, 
FROM ONE TO INFINITY 191–98 (2013). See also AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D. 
MEYER, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: THE SCIENCE OF SEARCH ENGINE 
RANKINGS 31–45 (2006) (explaining the mathematics of Google’s PageRank 
system). Certain tweaks to the algorithm over time have raised concerns about 
the neutrality or fairness of Google’s algorithmic process to competitors as well 
as downstream web businesses. See United States v. Google, Inc., No. CV 12-
04177 SI, 2012 WL 5833994, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) (granting an 
injunction regulating actions by Google); see also Frank Pasquale & Oren 
Bracha, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in 
the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008) (questioning if search 
engines should be regulated like personal data collectors). 
 38. See FRANK LEVY & RICHARD J. MURNANE, THE NEW DIVISION OF LA-
BOR: HOW COMPUTERS ARE CREATING THE NEXT JOB MARKET 28–30 (Prince-
ton U. Press 2004) (“[A] truck driver [possesses] the schema to recognize what 
[she is] confronting. But articulating this knowledge and embedding it in soft-
ware for all but highly structured situations are at present enormously diffi-
cult tasks. . . . Computers cannot easily substitute for humans [in driving and 
similar tasks].”). 
 39. See Radhika Sanghani, Google Driverless Cars are “Safer” than Hu-
man Drivers, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co 
.uk/technology/google/10411238/Googles-driverless-cars-are-safer-than-human 
-drivers.html (reporting a study making the comparison with data). 
 40. See Alexis Madrigal, By the Time Your Car Goes Driverless, You Won’t 
Know the Difference, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Mar. 20, 2014, 9:23 AM), 
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this technology comes the policy question of whether the algo-
rithm should be designed to do something individually rational, 
such as save a single passenger’s life, even if it is socially infe-
rior, such as killing ten pedestrians in the process.41 This type 
of ethical and legal question will likely occur in other fields that 
confront algorithmic processing, including antitrust law.42 
 On another dimension, algorithmic processes have altered 
the ways in which people conduct their affairs in realms that 
are usually seen to be less cold-bloodedly rational than Internet 
searching or driving.43 Online dating systems, such as eHarmo-
ny, have grown in scope and influence even as they have 
evolved in sophistication.44 These services’ algorithms have 
garnered greater autonomy in matching customers, particular-
ly as they have learned that they can be more successful by 
matching their customers based on data collected about them 
rather than by solely focusing on what their customers actually 
say they are looking for in a partner.45 Algorithmic processes 
have similarly penetrated into health care spheres that tradi-
tionally mix uneasily with commerce.46 The process by which 
available donor organs come to be matched with those who 
need transplants has become increasingly automated.47 If 
 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/03/04/285740673/by-the-time 
-your-car-goes-driverless-you-wont-know-the-difference (describing recent de-
velopments in driverless cars).  
 41. See Eric Limer, Should Your Driverless Car Kill You to Save Two Peo-
ple?, GIZMODO (May 12, 2014), http://gizmodo.com/should-your-driverless-car 
-kill-you-to-save-two-other-p-1575246184 (questioning whether a driverless 
car should sacrifice its driver in a crash to save more lives).  
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 146–80 (1994) 
(discussing economic rationality and human sexual behavior); Richard A. Pos-
ner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987) 
(discussing economic rationality and babyselling). 
 44. See DAN SLATER, LOVE IN THE TIME OF ALGORITHMS: WHAT TECH-
NOLOGY DOES TO MEETING AND MATING 86–87 (2013) (describing the complex 
process of matchmaking on eHarmony). 
 45. See David DiSalvo, Why the Future of Online Dating Relies on  
Ignoring You, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
daviddisalvo/2013/12/07/why-the-future-of-online-dating-relies-on-ignoring 
-you (arguing that dating websites should use algorithms instead of personal 
submissions to determine ideal matches). 
 46. See Vinod Khosla, Do We Need Doctors or Algorithms, TECH CRUNCH 
(Jan. 10, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/10/doctors-or-algorithms (advo-
cating for increased use of algorithms to aid in more efficient healthcare and 
diagnoses).  
 47. See STEINER, supra note 10, at 149–51 (discussing use of algorithms to 
make matches for transplants); see also Henry Hansmann, The Economics and 
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y L. 57 (consid-
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Americans increasingly delegate driving, love, and life-and-
death decisions to automated algorithms, few areas can remain 
off-limits. 
B. THE RISE OF THE MACHINES—SEND IN THE ROBO-SELLERS 
Where driving, love, and life mix as ingredients, one might 
cook up shopping. Algorithmic processes already meld into 
software that autonomously makes pricing and output deci-
sions based on market conditions, and then make offers to con-
sumers.48 Indeed, this capability has become commonplace in 
some non-physical markets. Already, finance and the travel in-
dustry make ample use of software that algorithmically adjusts 
prices based on supply and demand data. Relatedly, existing 
software tools alter prices to consumers based on information 
about changes in demand. Increasingly, decisions on the sales 
of physical products are delegated to algorithm-driven robo-
sellers. 
Initially, algorithmic pricing and automated trading 
emerged as a seismic force in finance.49 The ability of computers 
to gather, digest, and act has fundamentally transformed fi-
nance from a human-dominated business to one co-inhabited by 
humans and computers in synergy, in a kind of “cyborg fi-
nance.”50 Aided by SEC regulations that fostered technological 
change,51 finance-industry participants have deployed incredi-
bly powerful and speedy computers that analyze and make 
trades using complex mathematical models.52 
 
ering impacts of market and nonmarket incentives for organ donation). 
 48. See, e.g., Barney Jopson, Amazon “Robo-Pricing” Sparks Fears, FIN. 
TIMES (Jul. 8, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26c5bb7a-c12f 
-11e1-8179-00144feabdc0.html; SLATER, supra note 44.  
 49. For a description of the rise of algorithmic trading in finance—and a 
harsh critique of its misuse, see MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET 
REVOLT (2014). See also SAL AMUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: 
HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL 
STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 141–
50 (2012) (describing how algorithms are used in trading stocks today); SCOTT 
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIG-
GING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET (2013) (describing the practice and future of 
using algorithms in stock trading). 
 50. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 687 
(2013) (stating that “[m]odern finance is cyborg finance” as “the key players 
are part human and part machine”). 
 51. Id. at 688 (describing how Reg ATS and Reg NMS permitted new trad-
ing systems and the development of electronic communications networks link-
ing existing previously separate markets). 
 52. See SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH 
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The entry of algorithm-driven software into the financial 
industry has raised concerns about its safety and impact on the 
investing public. Notably, the May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash,” in 
which $1 trillion in market value vanished in less than an 
hour, raised doubts about algorithm-driven automated trading, 
as SEC and CFTC inquiries concluded that such traders played 
a significant role.53 More broadly, however, concerns have aris-
en that automated trading exposes the investing public to new, 
large-scale risks, including the possibility of harder-to-detect 
insider trading, the potential for asymmetries of speed to 
unlevel the securities playing field against smaller investors, 
and the weakness of existing disclosure regimes in the new con-
text.54 
The tools employed in finance have migrated into the sales 
of non-financial products. Initially, these tools made their ap-
pearance on online retail sites, such as Amazon.55 Just as they 
did with financial markets, such tools drove an increasingly 
high rate of price variability in response to massive rapid com-
petitive data collection.56 For example, in November 2012, dur-
ing the lead-up to the holiday season, Amazon made 2.5 million 
price changes per day utilizing such technologies; brick-and-
mortar retailers such as Wal-Mart operating more traditionally 
only made about 50,000 price changes during that entire 
month.57 The promise of such technology is to steal away cus-
tomers from rivals by responding more nimbly to changes in 
supply and demand—the epitome of competition. 
However, as in the financial industry, the implementation 
of algorithm-based trading in other markets has had its hic-
cups. In addition to the previously-mentioned problems with 
$23 million dollar biology textbooks, Amazon has had to battle 
the creation of “dummy” accounts formed only to try to trick 
 
WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 36–38 (2010) 
(describing the strategy of convertible bond arbitrage). 
 53. CFTC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 
2010, 1 (2010). 
 54. For an overview of these concerns, see LEWIS, supra note 49. See also 
Lin, supra note 50, at 720–21 (discussing the use of technology in finance). 
 55. See Jopson, supra note 48 (discussing use of financial-industry derived 
algorithms on Amazon and other online retailers). 
 56. Id. (noting that “[h]igh-speed trading tools pioneered in the stock 
market are increasingly driving price movements on Amazon as sellers use 
them to undercut” each other). 
 57. Tom Ryan, Amazon’s Price Changing Machine, RETAILWIRE (Dec. 19, 
2013), http://www.retailwire.com/discussion/17222/amazons-price-changing 
-machine. 
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other algorithms into mispricing goods on the site.58 United Air-
lines has famously had to deal with algorithms that mistakenly 
priced and offered consumers airfares as low as $5.59 Such er-
rors appear to be the exception rather than the rule, however, 
and the adoption of such technology continues apace. 
At the same time, so-called “dynamic pricing” has also 
spread beyond its initial beachhead in the sale of travel and 
utilities. The term “dynamic pricing” has recently come to over-
lap with, and at times include, the sort of algorithmic-based 
trading that emerged in the financial sector. Initially, however, 
it denoted pricing based on proxies for competitive intelligence 
about demand, such as time of day, season, or weather. For ex-
ample, airlines increase the price of tickets to Colorado ski des-
tinations based on the availability of snow, and electrical utili-
ties charge less per kilowatt-hour during nighttime, when air 
conditioning is used less.60 Some vending machines already 
possess sensors by which they adjust beverage prices based on 
the outside temperature.61 
In these early manifestations, dynamic pricing merely used 
crude stand-ins—time, temperature, season—to make ballpark 
estimates of changes in demand. However, with greater data 
collection and high-powered data analysis, the possibility of 
measuring demand more precisely has emerged. As a result, 
the term dynamic pricing has come to also include algorithmic 
pricing in which directly collected competitive data on supply 
and demand is used to drive automated pricing decisions.62 
 
 58. See Jopson, supra note 55 (describing dummy accounts). 
 59. See Hugo Martin, Glitch Causes United to Sell Tickets for as Little as 
$2.50, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-
fi-mo-glitch-causes-united-to-sells-tickets-for-as-little-as-250-20130912,0, 
488189.story (noting the glitch appears to have been the product of how Unit-
ed’s pricing algorithm dealt with fuel surcharges); Nick Vivion, Exploiting Air 
Fare Glitches: The Moral, the Righteous and the Opportunistic, TNOOZ  
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.tnooz.com/article/exploiting-fare-glitches-moral 
-righteous-opportunistic (presenting arguments for and against conducting 
extensive fare searches). 
 60. See Lisa Magloff, Dynamic Pricing Strategy, HOUS. CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/dynamic-pricing-strategy-5117.html (last visit-
ed Mar. 15, 2016) (describing the concept of dynamic pricing). 
 61. See Evgeny Morozov, Requiem for Our Wonderfully Inefficient World, 
SLATE (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/ 
2013/04/senor_based_dynamic_pricing_may_be_efficient_but_it_could_create_ 
inequality.html. 
 62. Examples include IBM’s DemandTec Price Optimization software. See 
IBM Price Optimization, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ 
price-optimization (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
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Notwithstanding the terminology, this development is a natu-
ral—and critical—progression that can provide important bene-
fits to producers and consumers in more efficiently matching 
supply with demand. 
Software tools already exist to help firms optimize their 
prices to achieve sales, volume, profit, and price objectives.63 In-
creasingly sophisticated software solutions model and forecast 
the interdependence between supply and demand to predict 
market prices for commodities, and in turn propose—and exe-
cute—pricing strategies.64 At the same time, the nascent field of 
demand chain optimization—the flip side of the more familiar 
field of supply chain management—is trying to use software 
and mathematical algorithms to proactively manage the pull of 
consumer demand and its effects on a firm and its suppliers. 
Firms already, right now, cede pricing decisions to algo-
rithm-laden software tools that monitor supply and demand. 
No longer are robo-sellers deployed only to sell services and in-
tangible products. Increasingly, they are being used to sell 
physical-world products, such as cereal and cameras, both 
online and in concert with brick-and-mortar stores. Consider a 
description of how retailers use the Mercent software platform:  
[O]nce we have the information from the retailer’s line of business 
software systems, we layer in our own real-time Web analytics. That 
tracks where shoppers are coming from . . . what they’re buying, and 
most recently we’ve added to that data mix real-time monitoring of 
product availability and pricing so that our clients can use the 
Mercent platform to keep tabs on what’s happening in the [broader] 
market. And the rate at which we’re able to collect that competitive 
intelligence, match competitor products against our clients’ own cata-
log, and then ultimately determine a new price point for the SKU 
[stock keeping unit, denoting a distinct product and its attributes for 
inventory management], is currently at about 2 million products per 
hour.65 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., PROS PRICING SOLUTION SUITE, http://microsoft-sapphire 
.com/orlando/resources/Partners/PROS/PROS_Pricing_Solution_Suite.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2016) (describing software solution that claims to “[c]reate the 
right price for each customer and product by setting science-based optimized 
pricing strategies and automating price list management”); see also Heather 
Clancy, This Analytics Software Keeps the Price Right, in Near Real Time, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/pros-pricing-software 
(describing software sold by firms such as Zilliant, Vendavo as well as PROS, 
that “can analyze historic pricing and, through analysis, come up with better 
pricing for managing margin”). 
 65. Steven Cherry, Dynamic Pricing: “How Much” Is Not a Simple Ques-
tion, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 15, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/ 
podcast/telecom/internet/dynamic-pricing-how-much-is-not-a-simple-question. 
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Delegating competitive intelligence gathering and pricing 
to a robo-seller creates the ability to collect and crunch compet-
itive data and respond more quickly than is humanly possible. 
Brick-and-mortar stores, such as Best Buy and Macy’s, already 
use algorithmic processes to react to fast changes in price driv-
en by their customers’ use of competing online sellers.66 
In short, competitive response and pricing decisions are in-
creasingly being transferred away from humans to algorithm-
driven software. Tools formerly—and famously—deployed first 
in the financial sector are migrating into the real economy of 
goods and services in which virtually all Americans participate. 
This process can be expected to continue and accelerate. Were 
these tools merely to provide speed and accuracy, but not oth-
erwise alter market outcomes, they would not be a source of an-
titrust concern. However, as we have seen in the financial mar-
kets, the possibility of market distortion exists—technological 
tools have been used to capture consumer surplus for producers 
in the context of securities trading.67 As these tools migrate into 
the goods and services market, similar injury to consumer wel-
fare, arguably antitrust’s heartland, may also loom. 
The possibility of implementing such algorithmic pricing 
has provided a significant boost to efforts to collect and use all 
sorts of demand-relevant data in order to more effectively sell 
to consumers. These efforts have drawn criticism, particularly 
from consumer advocates. Some worry about the privacy impli-
cations of turning data about all sorts of individual choices and 
acts—including those not explicitly involving commerce, such 
as how and when one drives, brushes ones teeth, or goes to 
bed—into, effectively, a class of saleable information assets.68 
Others contend that sellers will be able not merely to better 
calculate a demand curve for their products, but will actually 
be able to gauge an individual’s demand, so as to increase prof-
its through increasingly powerful price discrimination.69 Those 
 
 66. Cummings, supra note 22; see Macy’s Peers into the Hearts of Consum-
ers with Predictive Analytics, RETAIL INFO SYSTEMS NEWS, (May 19, 2014), 
http://risnews.edgl.com/retail-news/Macy-s-Peers-Into-the-Hearts-of-
Customers-with-Predictive-Analytics-92848 (describing Macy’s use of algo-
rithms).  
 67. See LEWIS, supra note 49, at 37–43 (discussing these distortions). 
 68. See Evgeny Morozov, Silicon Valley Is Turning Our Lives into an Asset 
Class, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
9d2a73fe-a54a-11e3-8070-00144feab7de.html (describing how companies make 
commodities out of personal habits).  
 69. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text; see also Douglas M. 
Kochelek, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 521–23 
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concerns may be important, but have not traditionally been 
central to antitrust enforcers’ focus.70 Most relevantly for this 
Article, though, is the potential for data collection and algo-
rithmic pricing to lead to conduct that, while profitable for a 
firm, is harmful to consumer welfare,71 and difficult to address 
with existing antitrust law approaches. 
II.  ROBO-SELLERS, ACCURACY, SPEED, AND 
OLIGOPOLY   
The increasing prevalence of oligopolies in the American 
economy, and the seeming impotence of antitrust and federal 
regulatory policy to deal with their overweening political influ-
ence and their market power over consumers, have become 
matters of popular concern well beyond merely antitrust, eco-
nomic, or legal circles. In recent years, Professor Tim Wu has 
written about this issue in The New Yorker;72 similarly, 
The Atlantic has asked whether “more mergers” and “fewer 
players” spells “the end of competitive capitalism?”73 Other 
commentators in the popular press have reached beyond anti-
trust’s standard microeconomic and innovation concerns to ar-
 
(2009) (“If a monopoly firm could determine and charge the value that each 
individual customer placed on the good and could maintain the price discrimi-
nation scheme, then that firm could . . . charge each consumer the maximum 
value he would be willing to pay.”); Morozov, supra note 61 (describing dynam-
ic pricing in technology; see also Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics and 
Price Discrimination on the Internet, DIGITAL TECH. CTR., http://www.dtc 
.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/privacy.economics.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (not-
ing the tension between price discrimination and privacy online). 
 70. But see Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Anti-
trust Concerns, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 32, 42–47 (2007) (criticizing the 
outcome in Leegin, in which the Court declined to uphold per se illegality of 
vertical minimal price fixing); J. Thomas Rosch, The Common Law of Section 
2: Is It Still Alive and Well?, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163 (2008) (discussing 
the Chicago School in Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence); Peter Swire & 
Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer 
Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335 (2013) (discussing 
the “lock-in” problem with the right to data portability).  
 71. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 191, 191–201 (2008) (describing the concepts of consumer welfare and 
efficiency. 
 72. Tim Wu, The Oligopoly Problem, NEW YORKER (Apr. 15, 2013), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-oligopoly-problem (describing modern-
day oligopolies).  
 73. Jordan Weissman, The Return of the Monopoly, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/the-chartist/ 
309271. 
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gue that contemporary oligopolies pose real risks to our politi-
cal and economic system, asserting related engendering of the 
2007–08 Financial Meltdown and the ensuing “Great Reces-
sion.”74 
To the extent that the effects of increased oligopoly fall 
through the cracks of antitrust law, the advent of the robo-
seller may widen those cracks into chasms. For several reasons, 
the robo-seller should increase the power of oligopolists to 
charge supracompetitive prices: the increased accuracy in de-
tecting changes in price, greater speed in pricing response, and 
reduced irrationality in discount rates all should make the 
robo-seller a more skillful oligopolist than its human counter-
part in competitive intelligence and sales. Leading scholars 
have long appreciated antitrust law’s weakness in dealing with 
oligopoly; the robo-seller is poised to strike powerfully at this 
weakness, to the detriment of consumers. Moreover, the robo-
seller should also enhance the ability of oligopolists to create 
durable cartels. 
A. THE EXISTING CRACK IN THE SHERMAN ACT 
Black-letter antitrust law makes clear that Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive “agreements.”75 For 
many judges, lawyers, and other interested observers, that is 
the end of the story. Given the archetypal application of Sec-
tion 1’s text to price-fixing and restrictions on output, that con-
clusion is not completely unjustified; generally, interdependent 
parallel conduct, without more, has not been held to satisfy 
Section 1’s “agreement” language.76  
However, economists and leading antitrust law experts 
concur that, if we are concerned with anticompetitive pricing, 
the agreement requirement creates “a fairly wide crack” in U.S. 
 
 74. See, e.g., BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITAL-
ISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 248 (2010) (decrying increased con-
centration of markets and arguing that “no longer . . . can [we] fix the physical 
flaws in our financial and industrial systems without first resolving the basic 
flaws in our political economy,” which the author argues are interlinked); 
Zephyr Teachout, The Madisonian Impulse Behind Antitrust Law, NATION 
(May 18, 2009), http://www.thenation.com/blog/madisonian-impulse-behind-
antitrust-law (arguing Americans are growing used to monopolies). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014). 
 76. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1428 (2d ed. 
2001) (stating that “mere interdependent parallelism has not been held to con-
stitute agreement” but continuing on to discuss the arguments for doing so).  
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antitrust law for socially harmful conduct to fall through.77 As 
Louis Kaplow has observed, “what economics teaches about 
why we should be concerned about price fixing not only fails to 
support reasoning offered in favor of a heightened agreement 
requirement, but also cuts against it because the cases exoner-
ated . . . are those that involve the greatest rather than the 
least social harm.”78 
Indeed, this is a debate that goes back half a century to ar-
guments by Judge Richard Posner and Donald Turner; it has 
been rekindled by others more recently. Posner advocated a 
very broad interpretation of Section 1’s language that would 
reach interdependent pricing by oligopolists, even where they 
do not make an agreement in the common sense of the term: 
[A] seller communicates his ‘offer’ by restricting output, and the offer 
is ‘accepted’ by the actions of his rivals in restricting their outputs as 
well. . . . Businessmen should have no difficulty, moreover, in deter-
mining when they are behaving noncompetitively. Tacit collusion is 
not an unconscious state. If the sales division of a company recom-
mends that it offer a wider variety of products in order to exploit con-
sumer demand more effectively, and the financial division recom-
mends against that course on the ground that it will make it more 
difficult for the industry to maintain ‘healthy’ prices, top management 
can be in no doubt of the significance of its actions if it adopts the fi-
nancial division’s recommendation.79 
As a result, Posner argued for the application of the Sher-
man Act to firms that priced interdependently, even where they 
did not communicate or signal their intent to each other apart 
from observing each other’s price decisions.80 
Likewise, Turner agreed that the term “agreement” could 
not be limited only to conventional understandings of an explic-
it agreement—requiring proof of price-fixing contract formation 
would eviscerate Section 1, and at any rate was only one of sev-
eral possible interpretations of the agreement language in the 
statutory text.81 However, Turner thought that an approach 
like Posner’s was a bridge too far. First, Turner concluded that 
punishing businesspeople for such behavior was problematic, 
 
 77. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 157 (2003). 
 78. Kaplow, supra note 30, at 689. 
 79. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1576–92 (1969). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Turner, supra note 30, at 664–65 (suggesting through comparison 
between explicit and non-spoken communication that the former is sufficient 
but not necessary for an inference of agreement required for a Section 1 viola-
tion). 
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since, as in a competitive industry, they were simply rationally 
optimizing their prices given market realities.82 Additionally, 
Turner thought that courts were ill-equipped to regulate and 
remedy the pricing decisions that such an interpretation would 
identify as illegal.83 
The Posner-Turner discussion has been recently rekindled. 
Although Posner himself has recently walked back from his 
original argument,84 Louis Kaplow has picked up Posner’s ba-
ton and continued the run.85 Kaplow has cast doubt on notions 
of “agreement” required for Section 1 liability “other than in-
terdependence” of decisionmaking.86 He has further criticized 
courts’ reliance on “communications” for defining “agreement” 
and determining liability as an approach that is “hard to make 
operational” and “unconnected with the modern theory of oli-
gopoly.”87 He argues that, given well-accepted models of oligopo-
ly, “the cases exonerated on the ground that they involve mere 
interdependence are those that involve the greatest rather than 
the least social harm.”88 Despite these critiques, courts continue 
to impose an agreement requirement in a manner that often 
requires proof of direct communication or proxies for it, and 
this approach continues to have strong defenders.89 
 
 82. Id. at 666 (“[E]ach seller in [an oligopolistic supracompetitive pricing 
situation], in refraining from price competition, is not agreeing with his com-
petitors but simply throwing their probable decisions into his price calculus as 
impersonal market facts. . . . [I]t seems questionable to call the behavior of 
oligopolists in setting their prices unlawful when the behavior in essence is 
identical to that of sellers in a competitive industry.”).  
 83. See id. at 669–70. 
 84. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 782 F.3d 867, 874 
(7th Cir. 2015) (“Harvard Law School Professor Louis Kaplow . . . argues that 
tacit collusion should be deemed a violation of the Sherman Act. That of course 
is not the law, and probably shouldn’t be.”); see also Richard Posner, Review of 
Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 763 
(2014) (book review) (“I now think that I didn’t sufficiently appreciate the force 
of Turner’s doubts about the feasibility of an antitrust remedy for tacit collu-
sion.”). 
 85. See Kaplow, supra note 30, at 797, 815 (criticizing reliance on “com-
munications” to determine liability and casting doubt on notions of “agree-
ment” required for Section 1 liability “other than interdependence”); see also 
LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING (2013). 
 86. Kaplow, supra note 30, at 815. 
 87. Id. at 685. 
 88. Id. at 689. 
 89. See, e.g., Page, supra note 30, at 200 (“[T]he lessons of game theory, 
experimental economics, real-world cartels, and dispositions of price-fixing 
cases over the past four decades support refocusing the analysis and investiga-
tion of concerted action on the role of communication.”). But see Jon Fougner, 
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All things being equal, the advent of the robo-seller shifts 
the balance between these arguments in the direction of Pos-
ner’s half-century-old argument. Contemporary discussions of 
antitrust policy are dominated by the application of the error-
cost framework associated with Frank Easterbrook’s landmark 
article The Limits of Antitrust.90 Under this rubric, upon which 
the Supreme Court seemed to draw in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,91 the choice of optimal antitrust rules must balance 
their benefits against the error and administrative costs that 
they spawn.92 Automated pricing powered by algorithmic pro-
cessing and mass data collection should reduce the costs to 
firms to the interdependent pricing that concerned Posner, and 
that continues to worry Kaplow. 
B. STANDARD OLIGOPOLY MODELS AND THE ROBO-SELLER 
The reasons that the robo-seller makes interdependent 
pricing more feasible can be demonstrated by considering a 
very simple Cournot model oligopoly in which two firms pro-
duce the same good (no product differentiation) and simultane-
ously and independently select the quantity that they produce. 
These assumptions are crucial, though they do make the model 
a solid fit for industries with a lag between investment and 
production, such as pharmaceuticals, information technology 
hardware, and agriculture. One might question the choice of a 
model in which sellers set quantities, when robo-sellers, though 
increasingly being integrated into the supply chain, are for now 
primarily used for price changes.93 The simple answer is that it 
is the best model for assessing oligopolistic behavior; as leading 
economist Xavier Vives has written, “[a]fter one hundred and 
fifty years the Cournot model remains the benchmark of price 
 
Antitrust Enforcement in Private Equity: Target, Bidder, and Club Sizes 
Should Matter, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 36–37 (2013) (asking whether parallel 
conduct in the shadow of possible tit-for-tat retaliation is excluded from anti-
trust liability by Twombly). 
 90. Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 91. 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007) (discussing the impact of discovery costs 
and the fear of large erroneous judgments that even low plausibility claims 
spawn).  
 92. See Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Ex-
pected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. AND PUB. POL’Y 1, 22–23 
(2010); Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long 
Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 
2009–10 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 369, 382 (2010). 
 93. See supra Part I.B. 
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formation under oligopoly.”94 The contrasting Bertrand model 
implies that if firms select prices, then only two firms are re-
quired to achieve a perfectly competitive price level; but the 
Bertrand model’s theoretical result proves dubious empirical-
ly.95 As a result, the Cournot model is a better choice for model-
ing real-world oligopolies. 
Working through the model, suppose q1 denotes the quanti-
ty firm 1 chooses and q2 denotes firm 2’s choice, and that the 
demand for the product is given by an inverse relationship be-
tween quantity and price (as is normal) given by the function p 
= 1 – q1 – q2. To simplify, assume the cost of production to be ze-
ro. As a result, firm 1’s payoff is its revenue (the price times the 
quantity chosen) minus cost, or  
(1 – q1 – q2)q1  
and firm 2’s payoff will be 
(1 – q1 – q2)q2. 
Since firm 1’s payoff function is a parabola with the open 
part facing down, its optimal strategy can be found by taking 
the partial derivative of its payoff function with respect to q1 
and setting it equal to zero (thereby finding a maximum point), 
yielding 
1 – 2q1 – q2 = 0. 
Solving for q1, we get q1 = 0.5 – q2/2, and since firm 2’s pay-
off function is identical, firm 2’s best response is q2 = 0.5 – q1/2. 
As a result of this symmetry, q1 = q2, which yields the result 
that each firm will produce the Nash equilibrium quantity of 
1/3,96 which implies positive profits of 1/9.97 As has been ob-
 
 94. Xavier Vives, Cournot and the Oligopoly Problem, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 
503, 511 (1989). 
 95. See ANDREW LEDVINA & RONNIE SIRCAR, DYNAMIC BERTRAND AND 
COURNOT COMPETITION: ASYMPTOTIC AND COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 1 (2012), https://www.princeton.edu/~sircar/ 
Public/ARTICLES/dynBvsCprodDiff.pdf (“[T]he original Bertrand model re-
sults in perfect competition in all cases besides monopoly, which is unrealistic 
in most settings, leading one to conclude that the correct set-up leads to the 
wrong result.”). 
 96. q1 = 0.5 – q2/2 
  q2 = 0.5 – q1/2 
substituting for q2 in the first equation: q1 = 0.5 – ( (0.5 – q1/2) / 2) 
  2q1 = 1 – 1/2 + q1/2 
  4q1 = 2 – 1 + q1 
  3q1 = 1 
  q1 = 1/3 
and substituting 1/3 for q1 back into the second equation in the list, q2 = 1/3. 
 97. Substituting 1/3 for q1 and q2 in the first equation—the payoff function 
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served for over a century, this means that each firm will price 
at a supracompetitive level rather than competing away all 
profit to cost (zero in this example) as in a perfectly competitive 
market, even though they are not explicitly colluding, but 
merely calculating their best response given the duopoly and 
the market realities they face. 
This result—that the Nash equilibrium is higher than the 
competitive level—also obtains for industries with more than 
two players, though the margin above the competitive level de-
creases as the number of firms increases.98 The point is not that 
a Cournot model is the best or only depiction of oligopoly. Ra-
ther, the general implication is that even if the firms are una-
ble to explicitly communicate or agree, to maximize revenue 
they will each independently choose a quantity to produce 
which will result in a price that exceeds marginal cost—and is 
thus higher than the socially-optimal competitive price—
though it also falls short of the monopoly price.99 Such a result 
is also possible given certain assumptions in a Bertrand model, 
in which the firms directly choose price rather than quantity.100 
Moreover, as Herbert Hovenkamp has pointed out: 
One reason antitrust needs to take game theoretic solutions such as 
Cournot’s more seriously is that the resulting arrangements can be 
more stable than cartel solutions. Under collusion each firm has mar-
ginal revenues that greatly exceed marginal costs. This makes cheat-
 
for each firm—yields (1 – 1/3 – 1/3)(1/3) = 1/9. 
 98. Indeed, this is the central implication of the Cournot Limit Theorem, 
under which equilibrium pricing continues to be higher than perfect competi-
tion, but lower than in a monopoly, though prices approach the perfectly com-
petitive level as the number of firms increases. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 224–28 (1988) (discussing the Cournot model 
and limit behavior); see also ROY GARDNER, GAMES FOR BUSINESS AND ECO-
NOMICS 127 (2d ed. 2003) (“[W]hen the number of firms grows large[,] . . . 
quantity competition approaches as a limit perfect competition, a result known 
as the Cournot limit theorem.”). 
 99. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 159 (“[E]conomists have argued 
that firms in concentrated markets can increase their prices above the compet-
itive level without expressly communicating . . . [and] the resulting social loss 
[from oligopoly] (as compared to competitive behavior by firms with the same 
costs) seems to be quite substantial.”); James W. Friedman, A Non-cooperative 
Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 11 (1971); see also 
Kaplow, supra note 30, at 783–84 (“[F]irms in an oligopoly setting may indeed 
be able to sustain coordinated supracompetitive prices . . . regardless of 
whether each firm’s expectation about the other’s reaction arises from their 
mutual appreciation of their situation or is a consequence of direct discussions 
of the matter.”). 
 100. See Kaplow, supra note 30, at 784 (detailing a similar repeated game 
version of a Bertrand model that results in “coordinated supracompetitive 
prices” despite the absence of legally enforceable agreements). 
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ing [on one’s cartel partners by reverting to a competitive market 
price despite an agreement to fix prices] highly profitable. By con-
trast, in the Cournot equilibrium each firm is maximizing its profits, 
and no one has an incentive to deviate. For this reason Cournot-style 
oligopolies may be a much more substantial competitive problem in 
concentrated markets than are classic cartels.101 
Hovenkamp made this point almost a decade ago, well before 
the deployment of robo-sellers. 
To the extent that mass data collection and automated, al-
gorithmic pricing convey a better understanding of market con-
ditions to oligopolists, the risk of social harm due to Cournot-
style oligopolies will rise. Robo-sellers should be more effective 
than humans at sussing out the right choice of quantity or price 
in the absence of explicit agreement or communications. As a 
result, instances in which humans would be cognitively incapa-
ble of assessing their competitors’ responses become at the 
margin much more feasible. All things being equal, the proba-
bility that market players can successfully adopt Cournot-style 
interdependent pricing should rise. 
C. THE ROBO-SELLER AND PRICE-FIXING AMONG OLIGOPOLISTS 
The speed of response depends upon the time required to detect a giv-
en choice by the other player. The shorter this time is, the more stable 
cooperation can be. A rapid detection means that the next move in the 
interaction comes quickly, thereby increasing the shadow of the fu-
ture. 
 –Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation102 
 
In his classic study of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Robert Axelrod invited experts to participate in a stylized com-
puter competition in which their dueling software programs 
played a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. We are at the dawn of 
the deployment of the robo-seller, in which computers will par-
ticipate in real-world market competition. One possible out-
come: collusion and cartels, which are widely understood to be 
a solution to a real-world repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Axel-
rod’s experiment is on the verge of becoming our real world. 
To wit, while robo-sellers exacerbate the problem of oligop-
oly by potentially giving individual firms the incentive to raise 
prices even in the absence of coordination, they also make it 
 
 101. HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 161. 
 102. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984), http:// 
www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/axelrod.pdf (adapted 
version of Axelrod’s landmark work). 
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more likely that actual, and more durable, cartels will form. 
That is to say, robo-sellers are likely to play the repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma better than humans. Coming back to the 
Cournot duopoly model in the prior section, consider again the 
Nash equilibrium of q1 = q2 = 1/3, which yields a payoff of 1/9 for 
each firm. While this is better for the firms than a socially-
optimal, perfectly competitive market, in which price would 
equal marginal cost, it is worse for them than if they could 
share the monopoly level of output and each produced 1/4,103 
which would give them each revenue of 1/8 (which is greater 
than 1/9).104 This outcome would require each firm to cooperate 
or coordinate to lower its output (because 1/4 is less than 1/3). 
If the two firms interact every day, potentially infinitely, 
we can consider the implications of an infinitely repeated ver-
sion of the Cournot duopoly, in which each stage is as described 
in the static model previously.105 A possibility that emerges sig-
nificantly in the literature is that each firm will adopt a grim-
trigger strategy (also referred to as “Nash reversion,” since the 
parties return to the original Nash equilibrium).106 Each firm 
will select an output of 1/4, until and unless the other firm de-
fects and selects 3/8107 (which will increase its revenue), in 
which case the “victim” firm will forever select 1/3, causing the 
other firm to also thereafter forever select 1/3—thus reverting 
to the noncooperative equilibrium described in Part II.B. Econ-
omists have observed that one of the most effective methods of 
deterring cartel cheaters is for other cartel members to credibly 
threaten to lower their own price to the competitive level if 
 
 103. Consider a single firm model in which revenue is (1 – q) q. Setting the 
partial derivative to zero yields 1 – 2q = 0, or q = 1/2. Splitting this monopoly 
level between two firms q1 and q2 equally means each produces 1/4. 
 104. If q1 = q2 = 1/4, then, per the payoff formulae in the prior section: 
  Firm 1’s payoff is (1 – q1 – q2) q1 = (1/2)(1/4) = 1/8 
  and 
  Firm 2’s payoff is (1 – q1 – q2) q2 = (1/2)(1/4) = 1/8. 
 105. See, e.g., JAMES N. WEBB, GAME THEORY: DECISIONS, INTERACTION 
AND EVOLUTION 107–08 (2007); William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and 
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 411 (2011) (“[F]irms in an 
oligopoly are players in a repeated game.”). 
 106. See AXELROD, supra note 102 (discussing Robert Axelrod’s experiment 
detailed in The Evolution of Cooperation). 
 107. If firm 1 is the defector, and firm 2 does not defect, firm 1’s payoff 
function will be (1 – (1/4) – q1)q1, since firm 2 is selecting 1/4. Setting the par-
tial derivative with respect to q1 to zero yields 1 – 1/4 – 2q1 = 0, or 2q1 = 3/4, 
which yields q1 = 3/8, the output that maximizes the defector’s revenue. 
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cheating is detected;108 the data collection made powerful by 
robo-sellers should make detection cheaper and more accurate. 
As a result, cooperation will generate a firm the payoff of 
(1/8) ( 1 + d + d2 + d3 + . . . ) = 1 / ( 8 (1 – d) ). 
Selecting 3/8 means that the firm will get 9/64 (> 1/8 = 
8/64) in the first period,109 but that it will get a discounted (by a 
per-period discount rate d) 1/9 in all subsequent periods, which 
sums to a defection payoff stream of 
9/64 + d / (9 (1 – d ) ). 
As a result, collusion can only be sustained if the payoff 
stream from not defecting outweighs that of defecting, or 
1 / ( 8 (1 – d) ) > 9/64 + d / (9 (1 – d ) ), 
which is true when d ≥ 9/17. Essentially, the question to 
each individual cartel participant is whether its discount rate is 
high enough that the gains from defecting in the first period 
outweigh the future discounted costs from losing cartel pricing 
in each subsequent period. As a result, collusion is possible as a 
kind of self-enforced anticompetitive contract, when firms do 
not discount too much. If they discount future payments 
enough, then they prefer the current period payoff of defecting 
relative to the lost future payoffs. 
Three key aspects of the robo-seller exacerbate antitrust’s 
current “oligopoly dilemma.” First, the effects relating to the 
discount rate should make interdependent supracompetitive 
pricing more stable. Second, greater accuracy in detection of 
price changes will have similar effects. Finally—and perhaps 
most importantly—minimization of the human factor removes 
an element of irrationality and agency cost that will likely re-
duce the chance that a cartel is undermined by mistake or an 
individual employee’s priority of her own needs over that of the 
firm. 
First, the robo-seller’s effects relating to the discount rate 
should make cartel formation more likely and increase the sta-
bility of cartels once formed. Mass data collection and pro-
 
 108. See Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitchik, Cartels, Profits and Excess 
Capacity, 28 INT’L ECON. REV. 413, 413–14 (1987) (noting the power of such a 
threat); Garth Saloner, Excess Capacity as a Policing Device, 18 ECON. LET-
TERS 83, 83 (1985) (noting that the threat must be credible). See generally 
AXELROD, supra note 102 (discussing how an experimental tournament of du-
eling computer programs playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma yielded a similar 
version of a “tit-for-tat” strategy as the winner). 
 109. The payoff period in the first period will be (1 – 1/4 – q1)q1 since the 
other firm is selecting 1/4, and plugging in 3/8 for q1 yields profit of 9/64. 
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cessing should make a co-conspirator’s price cut more quickly 
detectable.110 The result will be to shorten the time period be-
tween defection and detection. As a result, given a particular 
discount rate, there will be a shorter time lag before the second 
period in which the parties revert to the lower-profit (but still 
supracompetitive) Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative 
Cournot duopoly.111 All things being equal, the first period gain 
from defecting will be relatively less valuable, and so the cartel 
will be more stable. 
Second, errors should diminish in the face of mass data col-
lection, algorithmic processing, and automated decisionmaking. 
Increased accuracy in understanding what is happening to pric-
ing in the market should lower the possibility that a price war 
would break out due to noisy price information.112 For example, 
better data collection and analysis should reduce the odds that 
a seller confuses a period of unusually low demand with cheat-
ing by its cartel partner.113 In essence, a robo-seller could come 
to function much in the way that resale price maintenance can 
provide certainty to an upstream cartel that agreed-upon prices 
 
 110. See Stephanie Clifford, Retail Frenzy: Prices on the Web Change Hour-
ly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/business/ 
online-retailers-rush-to-adjust-prices-in-real-time.html (reporting that “[i]n 
the old days, merchants sent employees into competitors’ stores to check on 
pricing, and days later ‘sale’ signs reflected new markdowns” but “[n]ow, so-
phisticated computer programs accomplish the same goal online within hours, 
and even minutes”). 
 111. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-
Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 300–01 (1987) (noting that “[i]f 
breaches [of a price-fixing agreement] could be detected instantaneously, the 
profits from breach would be driven to zero”—and the cartel would be more 
stable—“because firms could punish [the breacher] immediately” by lowering 
their prices in retaliation). 
 112. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 1430c (“[U]ncertainty 
about rivals’ behavior may force each oligopolist to act more like a perfect 
competitor . . . [and] [s]uch uncertainty [grows] . . . as public knowledge [about 
prices] fails or lags.”); see also Jonathan Bendor, When in Doubt . . . Coopera-
tion in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 712–14 (1991) 
(concluding that “noise” can lead to the collapse of a tit-for-tat strategy into 
repetitive retaliation if one party mistakenly observes a defection when the 
other party intended to cooperate); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for In-
novation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 431, 479 (2009) (observing that reliance “on informal enforcement can 
break down because relational enforcement requires that each party be able to 
observe and properly characterize the other’s behavior”). 
 113. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 30, at 788 (describing the scenario in 
which a firm mistakes a period of unusually low demand for cheating by its 
cartel partner). 
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are being followed,114 or that certain pricing systems, such as 
basing point or uniform delivered pricing, can simplify the task 
of monitoring prices.115 The dissemination of price and output 
information through industry practice or agreement has long 
been a concern for antitrust due to its tendency to facilitate 
price fixing;116 mass data collection and automated pricing pos-
sesses the potential to similarly turbocharge cartel coordina-
tion. In the corporate context more generally, Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout, as well as Carol Rose, have observed how a tit-
for-tat strategy involving clear threats, including implicit ones, 
can perform a role akin to that of trust in informal enforce-
ment.117 
Finally, implementation of algorithmic pricing and auto-
mated decisionmaking will reduce the possibility that agency 
slack will lead to choices by employees that undercut a cartel. 
Think, for example, about discounting again, this time by sales 
and marketing staffs. Experimental economics literature 
makes clear that humans do not maintain constant discount 
rates over a series of time periods; rather, they tend to heavily 
favor immediate payoffs, with a very large discount rate to the 
next period, but a smaller discount rate for subsequent peri-
ods.118 Salespeople and marketers may tend to use such hyper-
 
 114. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Assessing Resale Price Maintenance After 
Leegin, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 191 
(Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (discussing resale price maintenance after the Su-
preme Court’s Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision, 
and noting that it can help stabilize a cartel by “restrain[ing] the ability of re-
tailers to reduce prices” and “by making it easier to detect manufacturers who 
cheat on a cartel by reducing wholesale price”). 
 115. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 1435f (describing how 
these pricing methods can facilitate practices that promote coordination 
among competitors).  
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 
338 (1969) (holding that the exchange of price information between suppliers 
of corrugated containers violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act); Am. Column 
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411–12 (1921) (holding that the 
“Open Competition Plan,” under which competitors in the hardwood manufac-
turing industry exchanged sales information, violated the Anti-Trust Act of 
1890).  
 117. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and 
the Behavioral Foundation of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1747–
48 (2001) (noting that the threat of retaliation by one’s peers may lead one to 
“behave trustworthily”); Carol Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 531, 539–40 (discussing how employing a tit-for-tat strategy can engen-
der confidence in one’s peers). 
 118. See generally Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Pref-
erence: A Critical View, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002) (reviewing at-
  
2016] ANTITRUST AND THE ROBO-SELLER 1351 
 
bolic discounting; this may be rational to them, since they may 
be short-termers—in contrast, the firm itself is potentially im-
mortal. To the extent that this phenomenon leads them to offer 
price cuts (that management would not) that undermine a car-
tel, replacing their decisionmaking with robo-sellers’ should re-
duce that risk to cartel stability. Additionally, to the extent 
that sales people might offer a lower price than the cartel price 
due to intrafirm competition between them for promotions, sal-
ary increases, or similar rewards, replacing them with robo-
sellers also displaces a source of agency slack that undermines 
cartel stability. 
* * * 
The rise of the robo-seller exacerbates antitrust law’s 
longstanding weakness at addressing social harm from oligopo-
ly. Black-letter law’s blind spot when it comes to independent 
price coordination—that is, without overt acts such as commu-
nication or the adoption of facilitating practices—may become a 
cloaking device behind which algorithmic price coordination 
can readily hide. Additionally, the challenges that face explicit 
collusion by oligopolists may become easier to surmount with 
mass data collection and algorithmic assistance. 
III.  ANTITRUST LAW’S ROBO-SELLER DILEMMA: 
MONOPOLISTS AND MORE OVERT PRICE-FIXING   
  I invited experts in game theory to submit programs for a comput-
er Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament—much like a computer chess 
tournament. Each of these strategies was paired off with each of the 
others to see which would do best overall in repeated interactions. 
Amazingly enough, the winner was the simplest of all candidates 
submitted. This was a strategy of simple reciprocity which cooperates 
on the first move and then does whatever the other player did on the 
previous move. Using an American colloquial phrase, this strategy 
was named Tit for Tat.119 
 –Robert Axelrod, 
 The Evolution of Cooperation 
 
In contrast, antitrust law does not have a gap in dealing 
with monopolists’ anticompetitive acts or with price fixing by 
 
tempts to estimate discount rates and analyzing the preference for immediate 
utility over delayed utility); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dy-
namic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981) (estimating individual dis-
count rates from survey data and finding that, for gains, such rates vary in-
versely with the size of the reward and the length of the waiting time). 
 119. AXELROD, supra note 102, at 2.  
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firms that requires explicit coordination via communication or 
facilitating practices in order for firms to come to some kind of 
anticompetitive “agreement.” In these cases, usually analyzed 
as a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the Nash equilibrium is to 
“cheat” on the cartel and undercut each other, price fixers need 
an “agreement” to avoid the inferior (for them, not consumers) 
outcome of competitive pricing.  
Of course, because competitive pricing instead of collusion 
is socially beneficial, antitrust enforcement currently strives to 
disrupt the development of reciprocity and trust that can 
“solve” the Prisoner’s Dilemma that cartel participants face. 
The emergence of the robo-seller will require a conceptual shift 
in some of antitrust law’s bedrock doctrines. Antitrust law 
evolved over the past century-plus based on an embedded as-
sumption of personhood among the actors it seeks to regulate. 
However, the robo-seller presents a new antitrust actor whose 
strengths relative to humans may make it more resistant to ex-
isting antitrust methods of deterring anticompetitive harm.  
Antitrust law’s approach to three central issues presumes 
a human actor. First, in deciding whether Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act has been violated, existing standards seek to 
gauge a monopolist or attempted monopolist’s intent.120 Second, 
to try to deter competitors from forming an explicit cartel 
agreement in violation of Section 1, antitrust enforcement 
agencies adopt policies designed to sow distrust and fear. Final-
ly, where the existence of a cartel agreement is in question, 
courts draw heavily on common law contract notions such as 
whether there has been a “meeting of the minds” or “mutual 
assent”121 Concepts of intent, fear, and “meeting of the minds” 
presuppose quintessentially human mental states; they may 
prove less useful in dealing with computer software and hard-
ware. Each of these three issues is vitally important, since they 
deal with monopolies and cartels, the prime foci of antitrust 
law. Unfortunately, the approaches that current antitrust law 
 
 120. This is done either directly, see, e.g., Alon Y. Kapen, Duty To Cooper-
ate Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Aspen Skiing’s Slippery Slope, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 1047 (1987) (discussing courts’ application of monopolists’ 
intent); or indirectly, see, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sher-
man Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (2005) (examining defendants’ will-
ingness to sacrifice short-term profits for expected monopolization and the re-
coupment test for predatory pricing). 
 121. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 159 (“In determining whether such 
an agreement exists, courts have relied heavily on common law contract for-
mulations, such as ‘meeting of the minds’ or ‘mutual assent.’”). 
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takes to monopolies and cartels are a poor fit for regulating the 
robo-seller.  
A. THE MONOPOLIST’S INTENT 
Courts applying antitrust law focus on evidence of intent in 
deciding whether Section 2 of the Sherman Act has been violat-
ed. They do not punish bad intent for its own sake.122 Rather, 
they use intent as a guide to characterizing observed conduct.123 
In cases involving monopolization through exclusionary con-
duct, as well as attempted monopolization, courts have adopted 
tests that seek to gauge the monopolist or attempted monopo-
list’s intent. 
In dealing with exclusionary conduct, the Supreme Court 
in leading cases has adopted approaches that focus on intent. 
Two of the most-commented upon antitrust decisions, Aspen 
and Trinko—strikingly different though their opinions may be 
in their outlook124—both look to the alleged violator’s intent. In 
Aspen, the Court concluded that, for monopolization through 
exclusionary conduct, evidence of intent is “relevant to the 
question [of] whether the challenged conduct is fairly charac-
terized as . . . anticompetitive.”125 As a result, the Court held 
that a monopolist’s refusal to deal may violate Section 2 if the 
monopolist does not have a legitimate competitive reason for its 
conduct.126  
Subsequently, the Court readdressed the issue of intent’s 
role in understanding exclusionary conduct in Trinko, a case 
that contains strong dicta limiting Aspen.127 In Trinko, the 
Court endorsed a less plaintiff-friendly test than the one in As-
 
 122. See id. at 280. 
 123. Id. at 280 (observing that “[m]any kinds of conduct, such as the re-
fusal to deal with a competitor . . . [are] extremely difficult for courts to char-
acterize” and “evidence of intent can aid courts in the characterization prob-
lem”). 
 124. Compare Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585, 600–01 (1985) (finding an exception to the rule that even a monopolist 
has no duty to deal with a competitor) with Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Trinko, 
540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (describing Aspen as “at or near the outer boundary 
of § 2 [monopolization] liability”). 
 125. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602. 
 126. Id. at 604–05, 610 (upholding jury instruction stating that defendant 
monopolist’s refusal to deal with plaintiff “does not violate Section 2 if valid 
business reasons exist for that refusal” and concluding jury was justified in 
concluding that defendant did not have valid business reasons). 
 127. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (describing Aspen as “at or near the outer 
boundary of § 2 liability”). 
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pen, one that requires evidence that the defendant monopolist 
had sacrificed short-term profits by its conduct. The Trinko 
court took such “profit sacrifice” to “reveal[] a distinctly anti-
competitive bent.”128 While commentators disagree about the 
merits of the diverging approaches to intent in Aspen and 
Trinko,129 both tests clearly aim at the monopolist’s intent (or 
“bent”). 
Courts also focus on intent in dealing with allegations of an 
attempt to monopolize in violation of Section 2. Justice Holmes 
imported a specific intent requirement from the common law’s 
approach to attempted crimes into Section 2 attempted monop-
olization over a century ago.130 Courts continue to apply a three-
part test requiring a “specific intent to monopolize” as an ele-
ment of the offense.131  
Courts’ use of intent under Section 2 may well prove to be-
come more difficult in the era of the robo-seller. Decisions to ex-
clude, for example by refusing to sell to a particular market 
participant, will not necessarily be accompanied by a record of 
e-mail or suspicious paperwork from which courts may infer in-
tent.132 Courts’ reliance on particular changes of policy or price 
from which to infer intent will be hard to square with a new 
model of algorithmic selling, in which such changes may occur 
thousands of times per hour. Questions of profit sacrifice may 
become very difficult to answer when multiple different algo-
 
 128. Id. at 409. 
 129. Compare Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and 
“Sacrifice,” 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2005) (arguing against broader application 
of profit-sacrifice test), with A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Un-
der the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005) (advocating for a version of the profit-
sacrifice test). 
 130. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). 
 131. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454–55 (1993); H.J., 
Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540–42 (8th Cir. 1989); Int’l Dis-
tribution Ctrs. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1987); Wil-
liam Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
 132. See Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold 
Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforce-
ment and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 646–47 (2005) (describing, and 
decrying, courts’ reliance on documents showing intent in order to interpret 
potentially anticompetitive conduct); Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 
J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 801, 803 (2012) (defending reliance on such evidence to 
infer intent and guide interpretation of conduct); see also HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 77, at 283 (discussing the types of evidence jurors rely upon in analyzing 
intent). 
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rithms’ interactions are so complex that determining the “best” 
price available may not be realistically possible even with the 
fastest computers.133 Even where the notes of software writers 
are available, they may not provide courts with evidence as 
easy to digest as that of traditional sales and marketing staff. 
As a result, the current approach to intent under Section 2 may 
be hard to continue as algorithmic pricing and trading pro-
gress. 
 This would not necessarily be an unwelcome development 
for many antitrust experts.134 While Herbert Hovenkamp ob-
serves that, as a positive matter, “[i]ntent has often been anti-
trust’s ghost in the machine,”135 he nonetheless is normatively 
quite negative about intent, describing “[f]ormulations requir-
ing ‘purpose’ or ‘intent’ [as] generally unnecessary and some-
times harmful.”136 Even in those contexts where the Court has 
suggested other approaches to Section 2, it crafts such ap-
proaches as a proxy or filter to replace a direct inquiry into in-
tent.137 Similarly, Judge Posner has opined that intent should 
not be relevant in the context of Section 1 price fixing;138 the 
late Phillip Areeda questioned the usefulness of intent in the 
context of Section 2 monopolization.139 However, in practice, 
 
 133. See Sara Robinson, Computer Scientists Find Unexpected Depths in 
Airfare Search Problem, 35 SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS NEWS, 
July–Aug. 2002, at 2–3; Keith Devlin, The Crazy Math of Airline Ticket Pric-
ing, MATHEMATICS ASS’N OF AM.: DEVLIN’S ANGLE (Sept. 2002), https:// 
www.maa.org/external_archive/devlin/devlin_09_02.html (suggesting that al-
gorithms’ interactions are so complex that determining the actual single best 
airfare currently available would take longer than a lifetime using the fastest 
computers available). 
 134. See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. MCGOWAN, & JOEN E. 
GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
U.S. V. IBM 272 (1983); see also Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserv-
ing Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 617, 652 (1999) (suggesting the place for an anti-competitive 
effects test).  
 135. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 282. 
 136. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 651c.  
 137. See Leslie, supra note 29, at 1710–12 (observing that the recoupment 
element applied by the Court in Brooke Group in the context of a predatory 
price discrimination claim has been praised by its advocates as “a convenient 
filter to avoid all inquiries into intent in predatory pricing cases,” and noting 
that some jurisdictions continue to treat predatory intent as an element in 
such cases). 
 138. See Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 
595–96 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 139. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting 
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841(1989) (“The defendant’s intention is seldom 
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purging antitrust of what is claimed to be a subjective and un-
derdetermined inquiry continues to be theorists’ unrealized 
dream.140 As a descriptive matter, investigations into human in-
tent continue to play a significant role in antitrust analysis. 
The existing intent inquiry will fit the robo-seller only with ma-
jor alterations, if at all. 
B. DISTRUST AND FEAR AMONG EXPLICITLY COLLUDING  
COMPETITORS 
The antitrust enforcement agencies’ policies against 
Section 1 explicit price fixing by competitors focuses on sowing 
distrust among cartel members and putting fear of criminal 
punishment into them and their employees. Each of these 
methods is likely to prove less effective in a world of robo-
sellers. 
Cartel behavior has long been modeled as a repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma.141 Cartel members face a problem: because 
their agreement to fix a price is legally unenforceable, there is 
a risk that their counterparts will defect from the agreement, 
lower their prices, and increase profits at the expense of their 
cartel partners. If they all do so, their collective welfare will be 
worse than if they had remained faithful to their (illegal) 
agreement. 
As a result, cartel members must find a way to make their 
commitments credible to each other.142 As Christopher Leslie 
has explained, a key method is to build trust among one anoth-
er.143 Indeed, experimental economists have found that face-to-
face communication of promises in cartel simulation games, 
 
illuminating, because every firm that denies its facilities to rivals does so to 
limit competition with itself and increase its profits. Any instruction on inten-
tion must ask whether the defendant had an intention to exclude by improper 
means. To get ahead in the marketplace is not itself the kind of intention that 
contaminates conduct.”). 
 140. HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 283 (noting that business decisions are 
“the product of many minds” and the “discovery search through corporate doc-
uments for evidence of specific intent is a turkey shoot”).  
 141. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 1; see also Ariel Rubinstein, Equilib-
rium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion, 21 J. ECON. THEORY 1, 1–2 
(1979). 
 142. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-
enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 296–97 (1987) (explaining the role 
of punishment in future periods in making current period commitments credi-
ble). 
 143. Christopher Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
515, 528–31 (2004). 
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even where such promises are unenforceable, helps human 
players build the trust they need to cooperate in maintaining a 
cartel.144 The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division’s leni-
ency program for cartel members who defect and cooperate in 
the prosecution of their counterparts sows distrust.145 By re-
warding the first to confess, the leniency program alters the 
payoff in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma so that cooperation 
becomes even more difficult; the cartel members need to be 
concerned not only that their counterparts might be planning 
to defect and cut prices, but also that any instability caused by 
unforeseen market impacts on the cartel will trigger a race to 
confess.146 
By contrast, any collusion by a robo-seller will not in the 
near future involve the building of emotional trust through 
face-to-face secret meetings. Instead, cartel stability will likely 
be generated by more rapid detection of cheating and more 
probable retaliation.147 Credibility will likely be generated 
through mutual expectation that swift retaliation will occur.148 
Whether as a result of cooperation under the leniency pro-
gram or, more generally, fear of existing criminal enforcement 
similarly will likely prove to be pretty weak tea in regulating 
robo-sellers. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Antitrust Division must prove criminal intent 
to obtain an antitrust conviction.149 Consequently, the Division 
files criminal actions only for clearly intentional violations of 
antitrust law, usually for explicit price fixing or bid rigging; 
overall, by the DOJ, the FTC, and private plaintiffs, far more 
 
 144. See MIGUEL A. FONSECA & HANS-THEO NORMANN, DÜSSELDORF INST. 
FOR COMPETITION ECON., EXPLICIT VS. TACIT COLLUSION: THE IMPACT OF 
COMMUNICATION IN OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS 26 (Aug. 2012), http://www 
.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_ 
Fakultaet/DICE/Discussion_Paper/065_Fonseca_Normann.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2016). 
 145. See Leslie, supra note 143, at 640. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Ayres, supra note 142, at 300–01 (discussing how this would hap-
pen with human actors). 
 148. See, e.g., Phil Evans, Presentation Before EU Directorate Generale for 
Health and Consumers: Dynamic Pricing Déjà vu All over Again—or Brave 
New World 8, http://judoeconomics.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/dynamic 
-pricing-pe.pptx (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (noting the ability of algorithm-
driven price data collection to reduce the incentives for firms to cut prices to 
consumers due to more rapid detection by competitors who are thus more like-
ly to match price cuts). 
 149. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978). 
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civil antitrust cases are brought than criminal ones.150 As dis-
cussed in Part I, imputing intent to a data-collecting, algo-
rithm-driven software process is difficult in the civil context; it 
should be even harder to find a requisite level of intent for a 
criminal conviction. 
Moreover, even if the intent problem were surmountable, 
the rationale for criminal antitrust enforcement cannot be 
squared with a world of corporate robo-sellers. The Antitrust 
Division believes that incarceration is the most powerful deter-
rent for price fixing, since it imposes costs on employees for 
which the employer cannot easily reimburse them;151 money is 
believed to be incommensurable with the various nonmonetary 
costs, including social stigma, to an individual of serving a sen-
tence in federal prison. Accordingly, the Division has had a 
standard policy of refusing to agree to a “no jail” sentence for a 
criminal defendant, though it will plea bargain concerning the 
possibility of serving a sentence in a minimum security federal 
prison camp.152 In the absence of a willingness to make the dif-
ficult leap of inferring criminal intent from a robo-seller’s ac-
 
 150. Only the DOJ can bring criminal antitrust actions, and it brings more 
criminal actions than civil ones. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2005–2014, http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/ 
download (identifying 8 civil cases filed by the DOJ and 45 criminal cases filed 
that year). The FTC only brings civil cases, and a search for the same time pe-
riod showed that it brought 242 competition cases. See FTC Cases and Pro-
ceedings, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/advanced 
-search (select “Competition” under Mission and announcement dates from 
Jan. 1, 2005 to Dec. 31, 2014) (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). Additionally, private 
plaintiffs, who can only bring civil antitrust cases, file suit far more often than 
the federal antitrust agencies combined. Paul E. Godek, Does the Tail Wag the 
Dog? Sixty Years of Government and Private Antitrust in U.S. Courts, ANTI-
TRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2009, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publishing/antitrust_source/Dec09_Godek12_17f.authcheckdam.pdf (showing 
roughly 1000 private civil antitrust actions filed annually in the federal courts 
in recent years). The disparity between criminal and civil case numbers might 
decrease where the focus is limited to Section 1 price-fixing, though such an 
analysis would be very difficult since cases often involve multiple claims of an-
ticompetitive conduct of varying strength. 
 151. See R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Speech Before the 2004 ICN Cartels Workshop: International Anti-
Cartel Enforcement 12–14 (Nov. 21, 2004) (transcript available at http://www 
.justice.gov/atr/file/517921/download); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL, § 2R1.1 cmt. background (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004) (stating 
that “the most effective method to deter individuals from committing this 
crime [of price fixing] is through imposing short prison sentences coupled with 
large fines”). 
 152. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGA-
TION HANDBOOK 90–93 (2d ed. 2006). 
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tions and imputing that intent to its human deployers,153 obvi-
ously neither reputation-harming stigma nor fear of prison are 
likely to alter a robo-seller’s behavior. 
C. SECTION 1 “AGREEMENT” AND A MEETING OF MINDS 
In Section 1 price-fixing cases, debates over how to define 
the requirement of “agreement” in the text of the Sherman Act 
have drawn heavily on common law notions of contract for-
mation.154 As a result, courts seek to find a “meeting of the 
minds” via an offer—sometimes referred to as an invitation to 
collude—and an acceptance.155 A robo-seller that relies on mas-
sive data collection, machine learning, and algorithmic pricing 
will not have the ability to communicate directly with other 
robo-sellers in the manner that humans do. That is, robo-sellers 
will not be able to conclude a meeting of the minds in an arche-
typal smoke-filled room.156 As a result, theories of agreement 
that require explicit, direct communication—apart from mere 
observance of market data and interdependent adjustment of 
prices in response—will fit the robo-seller poorly.157 
Because parties to Section 1 price-fixing agreements have 
strong incentives to be quite secretive about them, courts have 
fashioned approaches that allow for the inference of an agree-
ment in the absence of direct evidence. A classic statement is 
found in American Tobacco Co. v. United States: 
  No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful con-
spiracy. Often crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the acts 
of the person accused . . . . The essential combination or conspiracy in 
 
 153. See infra Part IV considering this argument. 
 154. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, § 4.2 (discussing various 
ways to find a price fixing agreement). 
 155. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) 
(holding that “[a]cceptance by competitors . . . of an invitation to participate in 
a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of inter-
state commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the 
Sherman Act”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[Toy] manufacturers were in effect being asked by [Toys “R” Us] to reduce 
their output . . . [and] [i]t accomplished this goal by inducing [them] to collude, 
rather than compete.”); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
556 (2007) (dismissing for failure to state a claim with “enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made”). 
 156. See Transcript of Record, supra note 7, at 4889 (testimony of Elbert H. 
Gary). 
 157. See, e.g., Page, supra note 30, at 178 (critiquing Kaplow and advocat-
ing an interpretation of “agreement” in section 1 that requires direct commu-
nication between competitors). 
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violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing or 
other circumstances as well as in any exchange of words.158 
To shape the process by which factfinders may make such 
inferences, courts have pointed to “plus factors” that make 
mere parallel conduct more suspicious, and to “facilitating 
practices” whose adoption renders parties susceptible to liabil-
ity for an anticompetitive agreement. However, neither conven-
tional plus factors nor the approach to facilitating practices is 
likely to be very helpful with robo-sellers. 
Traditionally, “plus factors” have included evidence of 
clandestine meetings and secret exchanges of information.159 
The delegation of competitive intelligence and pricing activities 
previously done by marketing and sales people to robo-sellers 
will likely render such plus factors irrelevant. Automated 
agents crunching massive data collections cannot “meet” nor 
will they necessarily exchange information—indeed, their abil-
ity to gather and process huge amounts of data obviates the 
need to do so. Price-fixing human salespeople need to meet in 
secret to conspire in significant part because they cannot actu-
ally observe each other’s prices comprehensively. As the ability 
to observe or deduce each other’s price information grows via 
automation, there is less need to conspire in clandestine meet-
ings; if you can independently, rapidly, and reliably verify, the 
need to meet to build trust is reduced. 
Antitrust courts also have focused on the adoption by com-
petitors of facilitating practices to infer an anticompetitive 
agreement.160 Typically, such practices make collusion more 
likely by changing competitors’ incentives; to the extent that 
their payoffs are properly modeled as an iterative Prisoner’s Di-
lemma,161 facilitating practices change the payoffs they face. 
Such practices include information exchanges among competi-
tors and supply contracts provisions such as an most-favored-
 
 158. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946). 
 159. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(pointing to aliases, front organizations, and the use of prostitutes to clandes-
tinely gather information from competitors as examples of particularly egre-
gious behavior demonstrating “an inexplicable lack of business ethics and an 
atmosphere of general lawlessness”); C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United 
States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir. 1952) (citing price hike during a time of 
surplus). See generally, Kovacic et al., supra note 105, at 405–07. 
 160. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006) (holding a joint 
venture that set prices as not per se illegal); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust 
Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 872–73 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (discussing actions that fa-
cilitated an anticompetitive effect).  
 161. See infra Part II.B. 
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nation clause (MFN) that enables a buyer to receive a discount 
that sellers provide to another buyer or a meeting competition 
clause (MCC) that requires a buyer to notify sellers and give 
them a chance to meet another seller’s lower price offer; these 
contract provisions have drawn significant recent scrutiny from 
competition enforcers.162 Massive data collection and analysis 
make information exchanges less necessary by providing the 
same sort of certainty about competitors’ pricing without the 
need for contractual agreement. MFNs and MCCs foster quick-
er detection of prices lower than those agreed upon by price fix-
ers; under current policy, the ability to monitor and process 
large amounts of pricing data should provide firms the price-
coordination benefits of these clauses without their cost in at-
tracting the attention of antitrust enforcers. 
* * * 
New technology and its incorporation into twenty-first-
century business models have created a mismatch between the 
emerging robo-seller and the paradigms centered on human 
traits that drive more than a century of antitrust legal doctrine. 
The robo-seller’s lack of identifiable intent, fear, or a subjective 
mind that can “meet” pose significant challenges to black-letter 
antitrust law. The question, as the next section discusses, is 
how antitrust enforcers can adapt to this challenge. 
IV.  ROBO-SELLERS: BOON OR BANE?   
In The Circle, a 2013 techno-dystopian novel by bestselling 
author Dave Eggers, massive data collection and processing al-
lows an innovative and ambitious corporation to exercise harm-
ful influence on markets and consumer behavior.163 Attempts to 
use antitrust law to combat its effects fail.164 The negative im-
pacts spin beyond markets to politics and beyond.165  
 
 162. See Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Developing an Administra-
ble MFN Policy, 27 ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 15–17 (discussing MFN claus-
es’ effects on competition); Steven C. Salop, Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate 
Oligopoly Coordination, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN MARKET STRUCTURE (J. 
Stiglitz ed. 1986), 279–83 (discussing how MCC clauses facilitate tacit collu-
sion and deter entry, helping entrench oligopolies); Fiona Scott-Morton, Depu-
ty Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, “Contracts that Reference Rivals” Speech at Georgetown University 
(April 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/contracts-reference-rivals, 3 
(discussing generally contract clauses that reference a firm’s rivals’ pricing or 
other actions, such as MFNs and MCCs). 
 163. DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE 173 (2013). 
 164. Id. at 174, 206, 259–60. 
 165. Id. at 489–91. 
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In a similar vein, our inner Luddite might ask whether, 
looked at purely from the increased possibility of su-
pracompetitive pricing, robo-sellers might seem like candidates 
for prohibition. However, as this Part will discuss, they do car-
ry the promise of significant benefits that might offset the risk 
they pose of decreased social welfare. Complicating matters, 
however, is robo-sellers’ own complexity; existing competition 
enforcers may struggle to handle this technology. Robo-sellers 
are unlikely to be good candidates for per se prohibition. In-
stead, a rule of reason approach would seem more appropriate. 
However, the application of the rule of reason to robo-sellers 
will likely be difficult, and prone to error. Alternatively, imput-
ing robo-sellers’ actions to the humans that program or deploy 
them might work in some cases, but would likely lead to highly 
unpredictable results given existing antitrust tests. Additional-
ly, the possibility of attributing agency to robo-sellers and han-
dling them directly might hold promise, though the deontologi-
cal reasoning generally used to justify recognition of robotic 
agency would be initially difficult to square with antitrust’s ex-
isting instrumental justifications. Finally, an evolving process 
of norm creation by the FTC, in tandem with its program of 
privacy-related enforcement, may be the best, if yet imperfect, 
current choice. 
A. THE EFFICIENCY OF ROBO-SELLERS 
The deployment of mass-data collection, algorithmic pric-
ing, and automated decisionmaking makes sense for several 
business reasons not directly related to the possibility of anti-
competitive harm. Employing robo-sellers promises a reduction 
of headcount in departments such as sales, accounting, and 
marketing. Robo-sellers can labor twenty-four hours, seven 
days a week without breaks—and can do so at a very high work 
rate. As the trade press describes them: 
In the old days, actual humans were dedicated to the task of following 
the competition. They scanned newspapers, advertising, investment 
reports, and journals, gleaning information wherever they could find 
it, never sure if there was high-value information that they had 
missed. Now that the process to gather competitive intelligence has 
been loaded into software, comprehensive data collection occurs in re-
al-time, and is presented on an easy-to-use dashboard. You can now 
dedicate 100% of your time to analyzing the data, rather than collect-
ing it.166 
 
 166. Kalie Moore, Harness the Power of Human Intelligence: Where Data 
and Strategy Meet, RIVALFOX BLOG (Feb. 21, 2014), https://rivalfox.com/blog/ 
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Understandably, this description may contain a degree of 
puffery. Realistically, however, in synergy with roles that are 
not automated, mass data collection and algorithmic processing 
promises to assist managers in making more, faster, and better 
decisions. Where the decisionmaking is also automated, robo-
sellers promise still more cost savings.167 
As a result, prohibition of robo-sellers appears unwise; 
something akin to a per se rule against them would be a poor 
fit. Fortunately, antitrust has longstanding alternatives to 
blanket prohibition, chief among them the rule of reason.168 As 
an approach, it is far from perfect,169 and involves quite a bit of 
uncertainty for antitrust defendants.170 Nonetheless, courts 
have more than a century of experience in ascertaining “wheth-
er [a] restraint . . . promotes competition.”171 If the answer is 
“yes,” in practice, courts ask whether the restraint could be 
achieved with a less restrictive means; if the answer is “no” 
then the restraint is redeemed.172 
At first glance, the rule of reason might seem useful in 
dealing with potential harmful effects of robo-selling. As dis-
cussed in the prior sections, automated pricing via algorithmic 
processing of collected mass data may tend to lead pricing 
above the competitive level, either via tacit collusion or more 
robust cartel formation. However, the significant labor cost sav-
ings and better competitive intelligence that robo-selling prom-
ises may partially or completely offset the potential for compet-
itive harm. In more technical terms, the possibility that 
producers who adopt robo-selling may see their marginal cost 
 
harness-the-power-of-human-intelligence-where-data-and-strategy-meet. 
 167. Dana Mattioli, Holiday Price War Rages in Real Time, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 24–25, 2012, at A1 (“[T]he rise of e-commerce, along with an explosion in 
data and the power of technology for analyzing it, has made it possible for re-
tailers of all stripes to monitor their rivals’ pricing strategies and react in se-
conds, sometimes with computer algorithms making the decisions.”); see also 
Moore, supra note 166. 
 168. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918). 
 169. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of 
Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1377–87 (2009) (analyzing deficiencies of the 
rule of reason against “rule-of-law ideals”). 
 170. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239 (introducing the rule of reason); 
DANIEL A. CRANE, ANTITRUST 52 (2014) (observing that “[a]t its core, the rule 
of reason asks whether, on balance, the restraint is good or bad for competi-
tion” and “[a]t its worst, the rule of reason feels like a completely amorphous 
and unstructured inquiry into all the motivations behind the restraint and its 
alternative and economic effects”); see also Stucke, supra note 169, at 1377–78. 
 171. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. 
 172. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, ¶ 1505.  
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drop may outweigh the incremental risk of deadweight loss due 
to increased supracompetitive pricing. Consider, for example, 
the discussion of Uber in the introduction of this Article. The 
Uber platform lowers transaction costs between drivers and 
riders, making possible mutually beneficial exchanges that en-
hance social welfare. At the same time, the platform coordi-
nates pricing between competing drivers, raising at least the 
theoretical risk of price manipulation that harms consumers. 
The rule of reason traditionally aims to try to gauge such coun-
tervailing positive and negative effects on competition. 
Despite more than a century of experience, rule of reason 
case law is not a perfect fit for the robo-seller. Firms are al-
ready employing automated pricing via algorithmic data pro-
cessing—but they appear to be doing so individually, not as 
part of an explicit or tacit agreement with competitors.173 How-
ever, though the rule of reason originated in a Section 2 mo-
nopolization case,174 courts have not specified how rule of reason 
in monopolization cases should apply so as to balance the anti- 
and procompetitive effects of a single firm’s conduct.175 Instead, 
the standard approach to single firm conduct asks first whether 
that conduct is “exclusionary” or “predatory”;176 conduct should 
be condemned only if it can only be profitable by injuring com-
petition and lacks any other legitimate business justification.177 
It is doubtful whether the employment of a robo-seller could ev-
er be deemed lacking a legitimate business justification, given 
the tremendous cost savings possible from sales and marketing 
staff reductions, plus the improved speed and accuracy of com-
petitive intelligence gathering.178 
In fact, most recent Supreme Court discussion of the rule 
of reason occurs in cases dealing with agreements among com-
 
 173. See infra Section II. 
 174. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 175. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 277 § 6.4 (noting that “[t]he mean-
ing and scope of the rule in monopolization cases are nevertheless 
ambiguous”). 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); see also David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs 
and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1217 
(2005) (describing Microsoft as applying the standard categorical approach in 
Section 2 cases). 
 177. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (ob-
serving that defendant’s conduct in Aspen involved forgoing a normally profit-
able course of business); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985) (applying profit-sacrifice test). 
 178. Moore, supra note 166. 
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petitors—that is to say Section 1 violations.179 In cases involv-
ing concerted action, antitrust courts have long taken a rela-
tively wide view of circumstances surrounding a restraint to 
decide whether its precompetitive benefits outweigh its anti-
competitive harm.180 While early statements of the scope of the 
inquiry were perhaps overbroad,181 the rule of reason in Section 
1 cases now tends to focus on the likely anticompetitive effects 
of a restraint adopted by competitors, whether they have the 
market power to make a difference, possible offsetting 
procompetitive justifications, and finally, whether there are 
less restrictive alternatives.182 For a couple of reasons, the robo-
seller’s mixed implications for competition will make the rule of 
reason complex to apply, thus tending to create uncertainty. 
First, similarly to the Section 2 context, the adoption of robo-
seller technology would seem to come with a built-in 
procompetitive justification: reduced cost and more accurate 
competitive intelligence. Thus, virtually all applications of the 
rule of reason to robo-selling will involve a difficult problem of 
balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects. Second, unless 
adopted as part of an agreement among competitors—including 
via a standard-setting or trade association—Section 1 as cur-
rently interpreted would not consider the use of robo-seller 
technology to be the adoption of a restraint by competitors.  
Thus, while the rule of reason aims specifically at consider-
ing balancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of 
a restraint, it is not well suited to dealing with the potential 
harms of the growth of automated pricing by algorithmic pro-
cessing of mass-collected data. In the Section 2, single-firm con-
text, the built-in legitimate business justification will tend to 
 
 179. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 274. 
 180. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 
(1979) (observing that the restraint at issue was not illegal “where the agree-
ment on price is necessary to market the product at all” and that the benefit 
therefore outweighs the harm); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 U.S. 36, 54–56 (1977) (balancing a restraint’s harm to competition among 
intra-network dealers against the benefit to competition among inter-network 
dealers). 
 181. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239–41 (1918) 
(adopting a rule of reasonableness to the application of the Sherman Act); see 
also HOVENKAMP, supra note 77, at 725 § 5.6b (describing Justice Brandeis’ 
statement of the rule of reason in Chi. Bd. of Trade as “one of the most damag-
ing in the annals of antitrust”).  
 182. See California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 781 
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (limiting the contemporary judicial approach to 
the rule of reason). 
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exculpate even harmful robo-selling; Section 1 may be inappro-
priate since multi-firm conduct is not necessarily required to 
adopt anticompetitive incidences of robo-selling. 
B. AN AGENCY LAW SOLUTION? 
In dealing with a robo-seller that takes anticompetitive ac-
tions there are three choices in attributing responsibility: to the 
robo-seller itself, to the humans who deploy it, or to no one.183 
The choice really comes down to the first two options, as choos-
ing the third option—no liability—would essentially provide 
immunity to anticompetitive conduct and results achieved 
through automation. Such a choice of inaction does not accord 
with competition law based on efficiency and the error-cost 
framework; the decision to do nothing would clash starkly with 
the current logic and assumptions on which contemporary anti-
trust law has been tailored and justified. 
The choice between attributing responsibility to the robo-
seller, the humans deploying it, or both, is not an easy one. 
Consider the choice of the robo-seller. First, to attribute anti-
competitive acts and impact to robo-sellers does not accord well 
with existing concepts of agency. The Restatement (Third) of 
Agency—already a decade old—states that 
[a]t present, computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons 
who use them. If a program malfunctions, even in ways unanticipated 
by its designer or user, the legal consequences for the person who us-
es it are no different than the consequences stemming from the mal-
function of any other type of instrumentality. That a program may 
malfunction does not create capacity to act as a principal or an 
agent.184 
Not too long ago, the view that computers must be seen as 
mere tools may have seemed uncontestable.185 And indeed, a 
move away from this proposition would probably require 
changes to multiple statutes governing electronic contracting.186 
 
 183. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 32, at 175 for a similar set of choic-
es. 
 184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. E, illus. 3 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2006) (concluding that “a computer program is not capable of acting as a 
principal or an agent as defined by the common law”). 
 185. See, e.g., Joseph Sommer, Against CyberLaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1145, 1177–78 (2000) (stating that “[a] programmed machine is not a juridical 
person and therefore cannot be an agent” and that it “cannot appear to be a 
principal, thereby triggering the law of undisclosed principals: it is clearly a 
machine”).  
 186. For the point that a computer is incapable of being an agent, the term 
“electronic agent” appears in some statutes as a defined term. The Uniform 
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At any rate, the law’s current stance that computer programs 
are simply tools of their operators creates tension with anti-
trust law. Such a view implies that the acts done by robo-
sellers can be directly attributed to their human operators. But 
as noted in Section III.A, as a matter of current practice, anti-
trust law uses intent or proxies for it to interpret allegedly an-
ticompetitive conduct. Thus antitrust’s current approach re-
quires a more in-depth investigation into intent than an agency 
law approach that would automatically pin a robo-sellers con-
duct on its employer as one might in the case of a mere “tool;” 
by contrast, no one asks whether a there is a disjunction be-
tween the effect of a baseball bat used in an attack and the in-
tent of its wielder. 
 
Electronic Transactions Act, § 2(6) 7A U.L.A. (1999) (UETA) defines “electron-
ic agent” as “a computer program or an electronic or other automated means 
used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or 
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.” 
With one addition, “electronic agent” is defined identically in the federal Elec-
tronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 
(2000). The federal definition concludes with the words “at the time of the ac-
tion or response.” 15 U.S.C. § 7006(3) (2000). Both statutes also treat “person” 
as a defined term and do not include electronic agents in a list of persons. The 
comment to Section 2 of the UETA is informative, stating that the definition of 
electronic agent establishes that it is “a machine. As the term ‘electronic agent’ 
has come to be recognized it is limited to a tool function.” The comment further 
explains that an electronic agent is the tool of the person who uses it and,  
[a]s a general rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results 
obtained by the use of that tool since the tool has no independent voli-
tion of its own. However, an electronic agent, by definition, is capable 
within the parameters of its programming, of initiating, responding or 
interacting with other parties or their electronic agents once it has 
been activated by a party, without further attention of that party. 
Section 7, the fundamental premise of the UETA, provides that the 
legal significance of a record, signature, or contract is not affected by 
the medium in which it was created. Section 9(a) attributes an elec-
tronic record or signature to a person if it was the act of the person.  
It further provides that “[t]he act of the person may be shown in any manner, 
including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to deter-
mine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was at-
tributable.” Under subsection 9(b), the effect of an electronic record or signa-
ture attributed to a person “is determined from the context and surrounding 
circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the 
parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.” Comment 5 to 
Section 9 states that the section applies to determine the effect of a “click-
through” transaction. A click-through, if executed with intention to sign, con-
stitutes an electronic signature. While the UETA acknowledges that a person's 
actions include those taken by human agents, Section 9 “does not alter exist-
ing rules of law regarding attribution.” UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 9 
cmt. 1 7A U.L.A. (1999). On conceptions of legal personality more generally, 
see Ngaire Naffine, Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsi-
ble Subjects, 66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003).  
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Moreover, as robo-sellers’ sophistication increases, their 
ability to act and price autonomously may make the current 
agency law’ approach untenable. In particular, some argue that 
greater ability to act autonomously counsels for greater recog-
nition of software agents as actors in their own right. For ex-
ample, in their book A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial 
Agents, Samir Chopra and Lawrence F. White have made a 
strong argument that increasingly autonomous agents such as 
robo-sellers deserve recognition as actors beyond mere tools. 
Unlike U.S. antitrust law—which is relentlessly teleological, 
particularly given its focus on consumer welfare—much of 
Chopra and White’s argument stems from deontological reason-
ing.187 Their proposal may be right for antitrust, even if their 
conclusion is not driven by consumer welfare or another in-
strumentalist goal; importing their distinction between auton-
omous artificial agents, including robo-sellers, and those who 
employ them, would be a good step for competition law. 
Antitrust law would do well to start formulating a more 
nuanced approach towards autonomous agents. The challenges 
may soon increase. For example, “agreement technologies,” a 
class of software agents, increasingly are able to manage sup-
ply chains and contract with either on behalf of the firms that 
employ them.188 These nascent technologies may eventually 
surpass robo-sellers by going beyond price and output setting to 
negotiating, crafting, and executing contractual commitments 
that may enable them cause anticompetitive harm. While it is 
too early to know how these technologies will play out, it is 
worth appreciating that robo-sellers may well represent a tech-
nological beginning rather than a conclusion. 
C. REGULATORS VS. ROBO-SELLERS 
The deployment of robo-sellers requires several large in-
vestments: capital, to be sure, but also time and mindshare—
robo-sellers involve the interweaving of mass data gathering, 
interconnectivity, algorithmic processing, machine learning, 
and automated decisionmaking. Accordingly, a useful under-
standing of robo-sellers’ implications for competition will re-
quire regulators to grapple with different complex ideas. As a 
result, it might be important to ask the following question: Can 
 
 187. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 32, at 172–73. 
 188. See Toni Penya-Alba et al., An Environment to Build and Track Agent-
Based Business Collaborations, in AGREEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 611–24 
(Sascha Ossowski ed., Law Governance & Tech. Ser. Vol. 8, 2013) (ebook). 
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regulators correctly answer the competition questions that 
robo-selling poses? This is particularly important given the ex-
isting gap for Nash equilibrium oligopolistic pricing; this im-
portant problem, which will likely grow worse, is not even cur-
rently illegal, though it does factor into merger review policy, in 
which regulators try to block mergers that will produce indus-
tries susceptible to such coordination. And can regulators do so 
accurately enough to make their involvement worthwhile? 
As discussed, antitrust law as it currently stands will face 
significant challenges in dealing with robo-sellers. Despite that, 
there are at least a couple of reasons to think antitrust institu-
tions may nonetheless succeed in addressing these new regula-
tory challenges. First, the FTC already is pursuing regulatory 
programs involving privacy, data collection, and price discrimi-
nation.189 This current regulatory push builds on the agency’s 
past experience in dealing with the collection of consumer data 
and its use by sellers.190 There is likely a substantial overlap be-
tween the knowledge needed to handle inquiries in these areas 
and that needed to address the potential anticompetitive im-
pact of robo-sellers. Second, the FTC has substantial capacity 
to interact with industry, consumer groups, and other stake-
holders to shape legislation and to generate norms to govern 
the proper deployment of automated pricing powered by mass 
data collection and algorithmic processing.191 
 
 189. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY, (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/  
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report 
-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [hereinafter 
DATA BROKERS] (summarizing information about data brokers and consumer 
privacy learned from investigative orders and calling for Congress to legislate 
and for data broker industry to adopt several best practices); see also Press Re-
lease, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Recommends Congress Require the Data Bro-
ker Industry To Be More Transparent and Give Consumers Greater Control 
Over Their Personal Information (May 27, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news 
-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker 
-industry-be-more. 
 190. For example, the FTC has enforced the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
since its enactment in 1970. DATA BROKERS, supra note 189, at i. Additionally, 
the FTC has already taken aim at consumer privacy concerns in the era of big 
data more generally. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRI-
VACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND 
POLICYMAKERS, (Mar. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era 
-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 191. Indeed, even prior to its May 2014 comprehensive report, the agency 
had already advised Congress about the impact on consumers of the data bro-
ker industry. See Prepared Statement of the Fed Trade Comm’n on What In-
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The FTC’s recent experience with the mass collection of 
consumer data is important, because regulation of robo-sellers 
by standard competition policy approaches may be quite diffi-
cult. As discussed in prior sections, conventional antitrust ap-
proaches that hinge on intent or on proxies chosen to avoid an 
intent inquiry will likely not work well when robo-sellers re-
place human sales and marketing staff and their paperwork.  
A second important problem concerns pricing and meas-
urement. Current antitrust analysis depends crucially on ask-
ing whether a seller’s conduct raises prices to consumers above 
a competitive level; this is a key question that competition en-
forcers and their economic advisers ask as they proceed with an 
investigation. Typically this is done by comparing the market 
price given the conduct at issue with a hypothetical (or pre-
conduct) competitive market price. 
However, it is not clear that the individualized and mo-
ment-to-moment prices made possible by algorithmic pricing 
will be easily amenable to comparing an overall price with a 
baseline competitive price. To take a related example in an in-
dustry experienced with such pricing, the algorithms used by 
the airlines in the twenty-first century change prices based on 
supply and demand. They do so with such speed, with such 
complex rules, and with so many interactions between them, 
that mathematicians have observed that, in fact, finding the 
cheapest airfare between two locations is actually unsolvable as 
a practical manner, since “it could take the fastest computer 
longer than the lifetime of the universe to find the solution.”192 
As a result, trying to do the standard price comparison may be 
very difficult;193 this type of measurement problem may grow to 
encompass other industries. 
 
formation Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 113th Cong. (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared 
-statement-federal-trade-commission-entitled-what-information-do-data 
-brokers-have-consumers/131218databrokerstestimony.pdf. 
 192. Devlin, supra note 133; see also Robinson, supra note 133. 
 193. Notably, in the context of the US Airways/American Airlines merger, 
the Justice Department’s complaint attempted a unilateral effects analysis, 
comparing selected moment-in-time pricing in selected city pairs where the 
two airlines competed with those in which they did not. Whether this method 
would have been persuasive to a court remains unknown, as the DOJ green-
lighted the merger subject to certain multi-year commitments by the merged 
airline. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competitive Impact Statement, United 
States v. US Airways Grp., NO. 1:13-CV-01236(CKK) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013), 
(explaining that settlement is in the public interest under the Tunney Act and 
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As a result, the better route to avoiding competitive harm 
may be to undertake proactive shaping of industry behavior 
through dialogue with stakeholders, targeted regulation, and/or 
norm generation. The FTC is comparatively well-placed to do 
this job. On a general level, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection has for more than a decade dealt with consumer pri-
vacy issues online.194 In a string of cases, the FTC has brought 
enforcement actions against companies that handled consumer 
information in ways that breached prior representations made 
initially when gathering that data—for example, by subse-
quently selling consumer data after having assured consumers 
that it would not be shared externally.195 Other FTC consumer 
data cases involve promising, yet failing to deliver, state-of-the-
art consumer data protection.196 
 
 
detailing the Department’s asserted remedies for competition concerns). 
 194. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the 
Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 251–52 (2011) (describing and 
critiquing FTC’s activity as an online privacy regulator). 
 195. E.g., News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Settlement 
with Bankrupt Website Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Violations, 
FTC.GOV (July 21, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/ 
07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-regarding (an-
nouncing settlement of charges against Toysmart after it violated its policy of 
not sharing customer information with third parties); News Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Online Pharmacies Settle FTC Charges (July 12, 2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/online-pharmacies 
-settle-ftc-charges (announcing a settlement involving misuse of online phar-
macy customer data for purposes other than physician consultation, in viola-
tion of company policy); News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Site 
Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal Information 
in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case (Aug. 13, 1998), https://www.ftc 
.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/08/internet-site-agrees-settle-ftc-charges 
-deceptively-collecting (settling charges that a website with a two million 
member virtual community was mispresenting the purpose for which it gath-
ered consumer data online). 
 196. E.g., News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guess Settles FTC Security 
Charges: Third FTC Case Targets False Claims about Information Security 
(June 18, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2003/06/guess 
-settles-ftc-security-charges-third-ftc-case-targets-false (settling case alleging 
that clothing company website claimed personal information including credit 
card data was encrypted though it was not and was left vulnerable to hackers); 
News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging 
False Security and Privacy Promises (Aug. 8, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news 
-events/press-releases/2002/08/microsoft-settles-ftc-charges-alleging-false 
-security-privacy (setting charges that Microsoft falsely claimed that it used 
appropriate security measures to protect consumer data entrusted to its 
“Passport” service, which would remember consumer sign-in and other infor-
mation across different websites). 
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The FTC’s experience with consumer privacy and with data 
brokers, as well its engagement in dialogue with Congress, con-
sumers, and industry on related issues, makes it a compara-
tively strong choice for dealing with robo-sellers. Because robo-
sellers require massive collection of sales data, their operation 
implicates actions and issues that overlap with data collection 
by online retailers and data brokers. Data brokers themselves 
already parse that data algorithmically to divvy up markets in-
to narrower segments for sellers to target, with shorthand 
names such as “green consumer” or, perhaps involving ethnic 
or racial targeting, “Urban Scramble.”197 The FTC as a regula-
tor is already addressing the possibility that such practices 
may lead to potentially harmful forms of price discrimination,198 
and Congress is already considering legislation in the form of a 
“Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act”199 that 
would further empower the FTC to deal with these issues.  
Steps beyond new regulation may be required. The FTC is 
already engaged in dialogue with leading data brokers such as 
Acxiom, Corelogic, and Datalogix that deal in data involving 
hundreds of millions of customers, combining both online and 
offline information.200 Discussions of best practices may help 
address feared harm from robo-sellers before it actually occurs. 
In addition, the FTC may need to develop new, independent 
competencies. For example, the private sector already uses “al-
 
 197. DATA BROKERS, supra note 189, at iv–v, 20, 47 (raising the issue of 
market segmentation and labelling possibly being a form of racial profiling). 
 198. See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU 196 (2011) (describing use of con-
sumer data for price discrimination purposes); Jeff Gelles, Time to Rein in the 
Data-Broker Industry, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jun. 2, 2014), http://articles.philly 
.com/2014-06-02/business/50248175_1_data-brokers-data-broker-industry 
-rapleaf (warning of possibility of data-driven price discrimination). 
 199. STAFF OF S., 113TH CONG., WORKING DRAFT OF BILL ON THE DATA 
BROKER ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ACT (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/13d141a3-76b8-4191-810b 
-ebbfd5125759/764C58973E7D889E72B470ECEDA988D9.data-broker 
-accountability-and-transparency-act.pdf; Meena Harris, Data Broker Ac-
countability and Transparency Act Introduced By Senate Democrats, 
INSIDEPRIVACY (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/ 
congress/data-broker-accountability-and-transparency-act-introduced-by 
-senate-democrats.  
 200. The FTC recently created an Office of Technology, Research and In-
vestigation, whose aim is at least in part to investigate the effects of algo-
rithms on markets. The Department of Justice also recently prosecuted its 
first criminal case involving the use of algorithmic software to fix prices. See 
Jill Priluck, When Bots Collude, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www 
.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude. 
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gorithmic enforcement” to press its rights in high-tech fields.201 
The FTC may need to employ such techniques in order to detect 
the anticompetitive use of robo-selling.  
Proactive regulation by the FTC will likely not be a pana-
cea. Nonetheless, it is important to avoid making the perfect 
the enemy of the good in an area undergoing such rapid and 
uncertain change. Significant resource asymmetries between 
business and government may drive doubt about the utility of 
regulation. Competition for profit incentivizes business to in-
vest and innovate in its use of technology proactively; govern-
ment regulators, not similarly impelled by market forces, tend 
to adapt in a more reactive manner, subject to political con-
straints.202 Nonetheless, cooperatively generating norms and 
best practices for firms employing robo-sellers may be a good 
start that also benefits from synergies with the FTC’s preexist-
ing regulatory initiatives. 
* * * 
As this Section has discussed, key systemic issues will 
complicate how current antitrust law handles the robo-seller. 
In sum, two key issues dominate. First, it is possible to under-
estimate the benefits of the robo-seller. Even if, as this Article 
has discussed, tacit collusion becomes more likely with robo-
sellers, they may nonetheless be so efficient that their benefits 
outweigh their harms. In more formal terms, using algorithms, 
software, and big data to do key business functions such as 
market intelligence, information gathering, strategic manage-
ment, and sales may reduce marginal cost even while they 
make tacit collusion and pricing to consumers above marginal 
cost more likely; the problem becomes a question of weighing 
the expected value of positive and negative effects.203 Second, a 
question that is difficult to answer under current knowledge is 
whether robo-sellers can be successfully regulated. Robo-sellers’ 
poor fit with existing antitrust doctrines, the complexity of the 
algorithms involved and their interaction makes this potential-
 
 201. See Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing: 
Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1483, 1498 (2014) (describing “algo-
rithmic enforcement” of IP rights). 
 202. See DANIEL INNERARITY, THE DEMOCRACY OF KNOWLEDGE 176 (2013) 
(“The government would only pay attention to innovation in a reactive man-
ner, adapting legislation to new technological circumstances . . . .”).  
 203. There are conflicting viewpoints on how to treat such a circumstance. 
Some commentators view any welfare transfer from consumers to producers as 
in conflict with antitrust law’s original intent and continuing goal, regardless 
of any offsetting overall social welfare benefits. See Lande, supra note 31. 
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ly a daunting regulatory challenge. Nonetheless, there appears 
to be potential synergies between the FTC’s exiting regulatory 
program for consumer privacy and a potential initiative to ad-
dress robo-sellers. 
  CONCLUSION: FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY TO 
SOLUTION?   
After almost 125 years of the Sherman Act, the nature of 
concerted action and the definition of price fixing remain con-
tested. This is unfortunate, since how concerted action is de-
fined is a critical question for courts to decide when oligopoly 
behavior crosses the line into price fixing—and deserves the 
treble damages and criminal penalties that such cartel behav-
ior entails. The advent of autonomous pricing via algorithmic 
processing of mass sales data can turn this doctrinal antitrust 
crisis into an opportunity for reexamination.  
In fact, antitrust is not the only area that will require ad-
aptation. Consider an analogy to the autonomous cars devel-
oped by Google and several major automakers. As mentioned, 
there exists a current debate over whether the algorithms in 
these vehicles should choose to save a single occupant even if 
that requires killing several others; this is a variant on the fa-
mous “trolley problem”204 in moral philosophy.205 At issue is 
whether algorithms should be designed to do things that are 
individually rational yet socially harmful. While that is a diffi-
cult question to answer, because it implicates ethics, policy, and 
law, it should be handled not merely behind closed doors by 
coders working for private firms, but through more open inter-
play between various stakeholders, including firms, consumers, 
and regulators. Similar logic should apply to robo-sellers to 
avoid results that, while profitable for individual firms, are 
harmful to consumer welfare overall. 
 As discussed, the problems with applying current antitrust 
enforcement techniques to the new challenge of robo-sellers 
suggest that a new regulatory dialogue is required. Fortunate-
ly, the FTC’s existing regulatory program provides a platform 
on which to locate that dialogue. If fruitful, that dialogue may 
 
 204. See Limer, supra note 41. 
 205. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the 
Double Effect, OXFORD REV., no. 5, 1967, at 3–4. 
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serve to help shore up an existing fault line in antitrust doc-
trine and theory. 
 
 
